




















Episteme is published 
annually by a staff of 
undergraduate students 
at Denison University. 
Please send all inquiries 
and submissions to: 
episteme@denison.edu
Statement of Purpose
Episteme aims to recognize and 
encourage excellence in 
undergraduate philosophy. The 
journal offers students their first 
opportunity to publish 
philosophy, and boasts examples of 
some of the best work currently 
being done in undergraduate 
philosophy programs around the 
world. It is our hope that Episteme 
will help stimulate philosophi-
cal dialogue and inquiry among 
students and faculty at colleges and 
universities.
The Editors consider papers 
written by undergraduate students 
in any area of philosophy. 
Throughout our history, we have 
published papers on a wide array 
of thinkers and topics, ranging 
from ancient to contemporary and 
including analytic, continental, and 
eastern. 
All submissions undergo a process 
of blind review and are evaluated 
according to the following criteria: 
quality of research, depth of 
philosophical inquiry, creativity, 
original insight, and clarity. 
Final selections are made by vote of 
the Editors and the editorial board.
Please see the Call for Papers at the 
back of the journal for information 
on submitting to our next volume.

E P I S T E M E
An International Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy
Volume XXXII                                                                    May 2021 
CONTENTS
Statement of Purpose and Editorial Staff                                                   2
Table of Contents                                                                                           4
An Agambenian Critique Of The Australian                                         9
Immigration Detention Camps
 Ronya Ramrath, University of Cambridge
The Epistemic Superiority of Berkeley’s                                                27
Ideal Realism
 Nathan McKay, SUNY College at Brockport
Virtuous Civic Friendships: An Alternative                                          45
Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of 
Political Friendship
 Kiley Komro, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
Practical Identity and Forms of Life: An Attempt                                55
at Clarifying Wittgenstein’s Ethics
 Christopher King, Grinnell College
Analysing and Resisting American Citizens’ Insensitivity to           73
Civilian Casualties of American Wars
 Henry Barlow, The University of Sydney
Call for Papers, Vol. XXXIII                                                                      101
The Editors would like to express their sincere 
appreciation for Chris Lyons, faculty advisor Steven Vogel, and the 
Editorial Board for their assistance in making the publication of this 
journal possible. 
We extend special gratitude to the other Philosophy Department 
Faculty: Barbara Fultner, John McHugh, Jonathan Maskit, 
Sam Cowling, Tony Lisska, Mark Moller, and Amy Shuster.

EPISTEME
Volume XXXII  •  May 2021
Episteme is published under the auspices
 of the Denison University Department
 of Philosophy in Granville, Ohio. 
ISSN 1542-7072
Copyright 2021
For copyright terms, please visit





An Agambenian Critique Of The 
Australian Immigration Detention Camps
Ronya Ramrath
University of Cambridge
Despite all of its pretensions to the contrary, the 
famously cruel immigration policies pursued by the Australian 
government over the last decades have begun to mar its 
image as a human-rights-respecting liberal democracy, 
though, I would contend, not nearly enough, given that 
other countries (among them the UK) have started looking 
to it as an example. Despite the overall lack of scholarship 
critically engaging with the Australian detention camps, in 
part perhaps owing to the lack of available information thanks 
to the government’s politics of secrecy, there has recently 
been a new rise in academic interest, due largely to the 2018 
publication of a refugee’s memoir detailing the horrors of 
immigration detention. Smuggled out in form of text messages 
on an illicit mobile phone, Behrouz Boochani’s work (itself 
heavily influenced by European philosophy like that of Giorgio 
Agamben) is both the chronicle of a silenced narrative and an 
invitation to intellectual engagement with the topos of the camp 
and its historico-political role in Australia. In this essay, I will 
first give a brief overview of immigration detention in Australia 
and Agamben’s biopolitical philosophy respectively in order to 
then analyse and critique the Australian camps on the basis of 
Agamben’s theories, utilising mainly his concepts of the state of 
exception and the accompanying homo sacer. I will then consider 
Boochani’s insights and his apparent hesitancy toward adopting 
the Agambenian notion of ‘exception’, outlining a possible 
critique of the term. Finally, I will argue that Agamben’s 
conceptualisation can accommodate Boochani’s concerns and 
that their respective theoretical narratives merge nicely to allow 
a more nuanced critique of the Australian policies and their 
effects. 
A Historical Overview of Immigration Detention in Australia
Mandatory immigration detention was first introduced 
by the Keating government (with bi-partisan support) in 
19921, but the project was taken to its extremes by the Howard 
1  Phillips & Spinks, 2013, p. 1.
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government following the 2001 Tampa affair, in which a 
Norwegian freighter carrying 433 rescued refugees was denied 
entry to Australian waters, an event that triggered a harsh new 
immigration policy known as the Pacific solution.2 A number 
of offshore territories were excised from Australia to render 
them moot as potential migration zones, and ‘unauthorised 
boat people’ arriving at these places were removed to offshore 
processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea (the latter 
of which is signatory to the Refugee Convention with significant 
reservations and the former not at all.) They were then 
detained in these camps indefinitely without any of the legal 
protections theoretically available to asylum seekers processed 
on Australian territory, as well as a marked lack of independent 
scrutiny
 Several cases challenging the intolerable conditions of 
detention were brought before the High Court in 2004, to no 
avail. Despite a brief bid for a more compassionate policy in 
2007, off-shore processing was soon resumed on both Nauru 
and Manus Island and brought to new heights with the 2013 
Abbott government’s hard-line ‘stop the boats’ campaigning 
and ‘zero tolerance’ policy toward ‘illegal maritime arrivals’, 
with the declaration that no asylum would be granted to those 
arriving by boat no matter how legitimate the claim and launch 
of the military ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’.3 The 2015 change 
of government again saw little improvement, even following 
the 2016 document leak of the so-called ‘Nauru files’ detailing 
“the assaults, sexual abuse, self-harm attempts, child abuse 
and living conditions endured by asylum seekers”,4 which, 
thanks to the complete blocking of media access to the island 
and the criminalisation of whistleblowing under the Border 
Force Act 2015 (which led to the dismissals of several medical 
professionals who dared reveal the deliberate neglect of asylum 
seekers, at risk of a prison sentence) had previously gone 
largely unpublicised. Although the  Morrison government in 
2018 promised to ensure the removal of all children from Nauru 
by the end of the year following a number of reports of suicidal 
behaviour and resignation syndrome,5 the 2019 Medevac bill 
(which would have allowed sick refugees to be transported to 
the mainland for medical treatment), initially passed against 
2  Phillips & Spinks, 2013, p. 9.
3  Martin & Tazreiter, 2017, pp. 102-104.
4  Farrell, Evershed & Davidson, 2016.
5  Pearson, 2018.
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the government’s will,6 was repealed soon after.7 Though the 
Manus Island Processing Centre has now been closed, the last 
detainees who didn’t die from suicide or neglect8 currently 
being held in a Brisbane hotel during the pandemic,9 Nauru 
remains operational.
Agamben’s Biopolitics and Philosophy of The Camp
Giorgio Agamben, an influential Italian philosopher, 
offers some of the more controversial critiques of modern 
politics (a matter that hasn’t changed with the advent of the 
Covid-19 pandemic).10 The utility of his work for analysing 
the discourses of immigration and the concept of the refugee, 
both in general and in the specifically Australian context, has 
not gone unnoticed, with theorists repeatedly drawing on his 
ideas. In line with a range of thinkers, among them Derrida 
and Arendt (who both influenced him greatly), he asserts that 
there is a paradox at the heart of sovereignty by which the 
sovereign is simultaneously “outside and inside the juridical 
order  as the entity that instituted the law and is thus capable 
of suspending its validity. As Agamben formulates it: “the law 
is outside itself.”11 In his philosophical complex, this dichotomy 
is intimately intertwined both with the notion of the ‘state of 
exception’ (in the sense of something taken outside (ex-capere), 
rather than simply excluded)12 that emerges from this limbo of 
juridical self-suspension, and the ‘bare life’ that inhabits this 
liminal space.
 Let us consider this notion of ‘bare life’ first: taking his 
lead from the Greeks, Agamben draws a distinction between 
‘natural’ life (zoe) and ‘good’ or ‘qualified’ life (bios), where zoe 
is located outside the sphere of the political and bios within 
it. Given this differentiation, he opines that in modernity’s 
attempt to (bio-)politicise ‘natural life’ by presenting itself as 
a “vindication and liberation of zoe”13 that values life above 
all else with the declaration of human rights, the spheres of 
6  Murphy & Karp, 2019.
7  Martin, 2019.
8  Doherty, Evershed & Ball, 2018.
9  Lynch, L. & Dennien, M., 2020.
10  Caldwell, 2020.
11  Ibid.
12  Ibid., p. 18.
13  Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 9.
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the natural and the political, “outside and inside, bios and zoe, 
right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.”14 
This zone, which constitutes a ‘state of exception’, is the space 
from which the marginalised figure of homo sacer or ‘bare life’ 
emerges, the “originary political element”15 that presents the 
basis of sovereign power.16 Agamben takes this concept of homo 
sacer (sacred man) from an “obscure figure of archaic Roman 
law”17 representing he “who may be killed yet not sacrificed”18 
– occupying the sovereign sphere, i.e., the indistinct space of 
exception that is at once outside and inside the law, homo sacer is 
simultaneously subject to the law but not protected by it.
 It is in this context of bare life that the central notion of 
the ‘state of exception’ – which Agamben associates also with 
the government increasing its powers in supposed times of 
crisis – takes on its full significance, a point he illustrates vividly 
with a discussion of the ‘camp as the nomos of the modern’ 
where he links modernity’s biopolitical tendencies with the 
historical rise of the concentration camp. “The camp is the space 
that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule”, 
the temporary suspension of law localised in a “permanent 
spatial arrangement.”19 The inhabitants of the camp are “wholly 
reduced to bare life”,20 homines sacri par excellence, residing 
in a space that, characterised by the (self-)suspension of the 
law, allows for the realisation of “the most absolute conditio 
inhumana that has ever existed on earth.”21 An important point 
to note here, however, is that this space of exception is not 
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid., p. 181.
16  It should be noted here that the distinction between zoe and bare life 
in the sense of sacred life, homo sacer, is not entirely clear, thanks to a certain 
inconsistency in Agamben’s discussion of the topic – sometimes he equates 
zoe with bare life, but in other places he distinguishes between “simple 
natural life” and “life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life)” (Ibid., p. 88) 
–, which has led to some confusion in critical readings of his texts. Despite 
the ambiguities, it becomes fairly clear however that homo sacer is distinct 
from zoe, or rather, living in the indistinction between zoe and bios; he is 
natural life exposed to the (bio)power of the sovereign.
17  Ibid., p. 8.
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid., pp. 168-169.
20  Ibid., p. 171.
21  Ibid., p. 166.
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simply outside the normal order, but by being initiated at all 
has been taken into the order: “Insofar as the state of exception 
is ‘willed,’ it inaugurates a new juridico-political paradigm 
in which the norm becomes indistinguishable from the 
exception.”22 It is this spatial configuration of indistinction that 
Agamben (ominously) calls the “hidden matrix of the politics 
in which we are still living.”23 In the modern move from politics 
to biopolitics, where life becomes more and more central to 
the State, “all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely 
real sense, to appear virtually as homines sacri.”24 Thus, as I 
will go on to show, Agamben argues that the camps with their 
‘exceptional’ status (despite the ordinary associations with 
that term as something anomalous and separate) are becoming 
characteristic of our contemporary political condition.
Agamben in the Australian Context
The loquacious, mythologising sweep of Agamben’s 
analysis can make it difficult to see the immediacy of 
application, despite the number of practical examples he 
provides in the course of his historico-political investigations, 
but the relevance of his concepts to the discussion of both 
refugees in general and specifically Australian immigration 
politics is evident. The refugee becomes paradigmatic of bare 
life, stripped as he is of the rights of the citizen, breaking the 
link between “nativity and nationality”25 and thus no longer 
represented by the sovereignty of a nation-state. According 
to Agamben, the refugee is “the central figure of our political 
history”, his rights no longer those of the citizen, thus making 
him “truly sacred, in the sense that this term used to have in 
the Roman law of the archaic period: doomed to death.”26 
Archetypal homines sacri, these are bereft figures who, following 
Arendt, “should have embodied rights of man par excellence 
[and] signal[…] instead the concept’s radical crisis.”27 Despite 
having ostensibly the greatest claim on human rights, these are 
only bestowed upon the modern citizen, thus illuminating the 
centrality of citizenship, ‘qualified life’ – it is the human qua 
citizen, not the human qua human, to whom ‘human rights’ 
22  Ibid., p. 170.
23  Ibid., p. 175.
24  Ibid., p. 111.
25  Ibid., p. 131.
26  Agamben, 1993/2000, p. 93.
27  Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 126.
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 Turning now to the specifically Australian context, the 
analysis can begin with the state of exception – consider the 
process of excision, where the government deterritorialized 
swathes of Australian waters and islands in order to remove 
them from the ‘migration zone’. What was this, if not the literal 
creation of a space of exception in which the laws governing 
asylum and the rights of those seeking it are suspended? The 
Minasa Bone, landing on Melville Island on the 4th of November, 
2003, had arrived on a territory that was in Australia – but not 
of. Towed back into international waters, the boat was pointed 
toward Indonesia, where the refuge-seeking Kurds onboard 
could expect to be returned to Turkey, their escaped point of 
origin. With this “marvelous [sic], brutal, incontrovertible logic 
of excision”29 – yes, they claimed asylum, but couldn’t, since they 
never entered Australia in the first place – the Pacific Solution 
with its acts of deterritorialization and offshore detention 
arrangements becomes paradigmatic of the state of exception, 
creating spaces that are both inside and outside the law and 
often consolidating these absurd legislative manoeuvres by 
establishing a camp, a permanent exceptional order localised 
(both geographically and otherwise) on the margins of the 
state. In the “dislocating localization”30 ‘Not-Australia’, the 
category of ‘national’ ceases to operate and life within this 
space is stripped bare, ‘human’ rights failing to find purchase 
without the necessary ‘citizen’-property to substantiate the 
claim. In removing the law from a certain space, the Australian 
state reveals precisely the paradox Agamben finds within 
sovereignty, legislating selectively for its own removal and thus 
extending beyond its own purported boundaries.
Thus, the birth of the Australian detention camp can 
be traced along the lines of Agamben’s biopolitical narrative, 
which he exemplifies with the establishment of the Nazi 
concentration camp. Seeds sown in an apparent crisis (in 
Agamben’s example, the 1933 Reichstagsbrand in Germany; in 
mine, the unchecked arrival of ‘illegal boat people’ in Australia) 
go on to trigger a (willed) state of exception (Agamben cites 
28  In Australia, these dynamics can also be illustrated by an example 
that predates the refugee, namely the Indigenous peoples – they, also, were 
not considered citizens and not human as such, in a detrimental double-bind 
where it isn’t clear which qualifier was lacking first.
29  Perera, 2007, pp. 201-203.
30  Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 175.
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the ‘Decree for the protection of the people and State’ based on 
Schutzhaft in Germany; I would indicate the Pacific Solution and 
its excision of offshore territories, in combination with increased 
powers for immigration officials in Australia) that then 
solidifies into a permanent arrangement (concentration camps 
in Germany, offshore detention facilities in Australia). Although 
some might balk at comparing the Vernichtungslager of the Third 
Reich to the Australian centres, human suffering can hardly 
be quantified, and the image of a child sewing its own lips or 
becoming catatonic from resignation syndrome holds no less 
horror than anything we might come across in regards to the 
Nazi camps.
Boochani’s Manus Prison Theory
The work of Behrouz Boochani, Kurdish-Iranian 
journalist and author who was detained on Manus Island 
from 2013, provides an intellectually informed insight to the 
lived experience of asylum seekers in the Australian detention 
system, and his ‘Manus Prison Theory’ offers an interesting 
complement to Agamben’s more detached ruminations. As I 
mentioned, Boochani’s personal engagement with European 
thought is evident, and not just from his translator’s remarks to 
that effect.31 However, despite the clear influence Agamben had 
on him, Boochani problematises the use of the term ‘exception’ 
as applied to the camps. Nevertheless, as I will argue, I think 
Agamben’s concept doesn’t just accommodate this criticism but 
also captures Boochani’s central concerns.
During his six years of incarceration, Boochani wrote 
a number of articles detailing the human rights abuses he 
witnessed, sending information to news organisations and 
human rights advocacy groups via a secret mobile phone. 
Finally, despairing of the limits of journalistic language, he even 
typed out a memoir in text messages, which was translated 
and published in 2018 (a time to which he was still imprisoned) 
to a number of prizes and accolades. There, Boochani details 
the horrifying absurdities and bizarre Kafkaesque logic of the 
camp with its endless queues, random privileging and selective 
starvation, senseless orders (shrugged off with deference to 
‘The Boss’), intermittent withholding of supplies, and denial of 
even the most basic human requests (a man is desperate to call 
his dying father, but since it isn’t his ‘turn’ he is not permitted 
to, despite the other prisoner’s willingness to let him take 
their place.) Boochani’s descriptions fit well into Agamben’s 
31  Boochani, 2018, p. 14. (Translator’s introduction.)
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theoretical frameworks, the prisoners conceived of as bare life 
within an unforgiving system ruled by the lack of law that 
is exception. They are dehumanised, at the mercy of guards 
who have through propaganda or personal experience come 
to alienate their charges entirely: “[…] a young guy has slit his 
wrists in the toilets. The guard turns to me and says, ‘Sorry – I 
can’t understand you and this petrified young guy. I’ve been a 
prison guard for most of my life . . . Sorry.’ This is the extent of 
his compassion.”32 The Kafkaesque elements recall Agamben’s 
analysis of The Trial, the laws of the system “in force without 
significance”,33 the refugees under the heel of a bizarre system 
lacking all logic. Motifs of Agamben’s philosophy specifically 
come up in several interviews, if not always with explicit 
reference – his influence is undeniable in the statement “now 
we are living in the age of camps”,34 as in Boochani’s talk 
of bare bodies and biopolitics, which is all very Homo Sacer. 
Boochani even refers explicitly to Agamben’s state of exception 
in his 2016 article “Australia, exceptional in its brutality”, which 
criticises the July 2013 ‘transfer arrangement’ and the exile of 
refugees to offshore camps in the light of Agamben’s theory: 
“Our legal status as individuals has been suspended and we 
become legally un-nameable beings, transformed into animals 
devoid of dignity.”35 
 However, as noted, Boochani maintains a certain 
distance to Agamben’s philosophy and appears to take 
issue with the term ‘exception’. In Manus Prison Theory as 
developed by Boochani and his collaborators, the relationship 
between Australia and Manus Island is tropologically imagined 
as a ‘transposable synecdoche’, an interchangeable part/whole 
connection that exerts mutual influence. In a recent symposium 
by Western Sydney University on ‘The politicisation of 
seeking asylum’, his translator Omid Tofighian spoke about 
the obstacles faced in theorising the relationship between 
Manus Island and Australia: although “we often talk of 
Manus prison being (in) a state of exception […] we also argue 
that Manus is part of Australia’s history, part of Australian 
society and politics, they’re both deeply embedded in the 
narrative and the psyche of Australia, a colonial state.”36 As an 
32  Ibid., p. 173.
33  Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 51.
34  Boochani, 2020.
35  Boochani, 2016.
36  Boochani & Tofighian, 2020.
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interchangeable part-whole relationship where either site can 
act as the regulating whole, it can be considered as “sometimes 
exceptional, sometimes not, and this as being interchangeable 
and fluid and everchanging. This helps to understand how 
Manus Prison can be exceptional and unexceptional at the same 
time.”37 
I understand this as a reservation with regards to the 
concept of exception based on the quotidian idea of it being 
isolated, independent of the normal order that governs the 
unexceptional, whereas in the construct advanced by Boochani 
Australia is bound up in its immigration policy and cannot 
detach itself from the horrors practiced on its margins. Boochani 
is convinced that this semi-externalised torture damages the 
fundamental humanitarian principles Australia professes to 
hold, the immigration policy infecting the supposed liberal 
democracy and threatening the advent of totalitarian tendencies 
in all aspects of life: “You cannot treat refugees in this way and 
treat your people the right way.”38 As an example, he draws 
a parallel between the system’s use of cigarettes as a means 
of control on Manus – “Sometimes they cut the cigarettes and 
said that you should do this […] For example, we refused 
to give case [sic] to them, they cut the cigarettes. We refused 
to go out to the new camps, they cut the cigarettes”39 – and 
the similar methods of resource-cutting employed to subdue 
environmental activists in Australia. He also cites the silencing 
of journalists and the bureaucratic hold on university research 
interests via selective allocation of funds, which he claims 
has led to the lack of serious scholarship on, for example, the 
detention system. These control mechanisms aren’t restricted 
to the camps but are replicated in Australia. For Boochani this 
is one of the most crucial aspects of the discourse: “if we only 
talk about the refugees and say they are victims under this, we 
cannot create change. People don’t care about the refugees. […] 
This policy is becoming a model for the UK, and I am sure other 
countries are looking to it as an example. So, when you torture 
the refugees, you are not only torturing the refugees. You are 
damaging many things. And […] now it’s a global matter.”40 
Thus, his emphasis is less on some isolated state of exception 






have for Australia and the world as a whole.
(Un)exceptional States
Despite the concerns Boochani raises regarding the use 
of ‘exception’, I argue that it is possible to read Agamben’s 
concept of it in a manner that encompasses these ideas – in 
fact, I think these ambiguities of (un)exceptionality and the 
threat of totalitarianism are precisely what his ‘imperfectly 
nihilistic’41 biopolitical theorising strives to expose. Recall 
Agamben’s designation of the camp as the ‘nomos of the 
modern’, the ‘hidden matrix’ of our present condition, a 
provocative thesis that very much anticipates Boochani’s 
conviction that totalitarianism cannot be contained: “Sacredness 
is a line of flight still present in contemporary politics […] 
to the point of ultimately coinciding with the biological life 
itself of citizens.”42 Despite the chagrin Agamben apparently 
felt at the appropriation of his homo sacer even by American 
neo-Republicans in their perceived marginalisation,43 he does 
suggest that “if today there is no longer any one clear figure 
of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually 
homines sacri.”44 Also, although his messianic notion of a coming 
‘new politics’ (no longer “founded on the exceptio of bare 
life”45) currently remains very much undeveloped, his claim 
that today’s “politics knows no value (and, consequently, no 
nonvalue) other than life, and until the contradictions that this 
fact implies are dissolved, Nazism and fascism […] will remain 
stubbornly with us”46 can certainly be construed in line with 
Boochani. Thus, it would seem that the bias toward the state 
of exception as somehow truly exceptional in the sense that it 
presents an outlier to the norm is repealed rather than realised 
in Agamben’s work – he repeatedly points out the importance 
of learning to recognise “the structure of the camp […] in all 
its metamorphoses into the zones d’attentes of our airports 
and certain outskirts of our cities,”47 a sentiment that recalls 
Boochani’s examples of how the structures of the detention 
41  Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 53.
42  Ibid., pp. 114-115.
43  Schuilenburg, 2008.
44  Agamben, 1995/1998, p. 115.
45  Ibid., p. 11.
46  Ibid., p. 10.
47  Ibid., p. 175.
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centre’s oppressive systems are echoed on the Australian 
mainland in all sorts of institutions. It appears that Agamben’s 
theoretical frameworks continue to provide an effective basis 
from which to critique and challenge the political developments 
that are currently taking place both in Australia and, as other 
states like the UK increasingly look to it as an example, globally.
Whatever a political future that transcends these aporias of 
bare life and the associated threat of totalitarianism may look 
like, a penetrating intellectual analysis of the dynamics of the 
camp and how these exceed the boundaries of the liminal 
spaces we pretend to relegate them to is crucial to exposing the 
dangerous trends that can be observed in our contemporary 
political culture. Although Agamben’s biopolitical opus 
certainly does not present the only perspective from which 
to approach this topic, it provides an interesting theoretical 
lens, both in terms of tracing the evolution of the camp and 
analysing the juridical circumstances that allow for the creation 
of ‘bare life’ on its premises and beyond. Several moments 
of the Australian policy development become much clearer 
when regarded from this Agambenian perspective, as does the 
bizarre logic that governs the camp in Boochani’s first-hand 
accounts. And although I do not know what other reservations 
Boochani may have toward Agamben’s philosophy, despite his 
liberal use of the latter’s ideas, the picture Agamben paints of 
contemporary politics with the camp as its hidden nomos, as 
well as the casting into question of human rights with the rise of 
the exception and homo sacer in all aspects of existence, merges 
nicely with Boochani’s own warnings of dictatorial overflow 
from a policy that is not hermetically sealed on an island and 
cannot be practiced selectively. It is only by becoming aware of 
these trends through a critical examination of the camps and 
the structures they are manifestations of that we can hope to 
reverse them, both in Australia and on the global scale.
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Abstract
In this essay, I analyze the three most prominent views 
regarding the philosophy of perception- direct realism, indirect 
realism, and ideal realism. I consider two relevant problems 
of perception, specifically the existence of hallucinations and 
perceptual relativity, and to what extent they are problematic 
for these views on perception. I first argue that direct realism, 
the view typically referred to as ‘common-sense realism’, is 
in fact far from common-sense. Although direct realists hold 
the common-sense view that we directly perceive physical 
objects, they are forced to hold the absurd view that we do 
not know what physical objects look, smell, taste, sound, or 
feel like. Further, they can never know if their perceptions 
are ontologically mind dependent or not. I then argue that 
although indirect realism is supposed to bypass the epistemic 
problems of perception bogging the direct realist down, its 
epistemic issues are at least as severe. Worse, an indirect realist 
cannot explain how an unperceived physical object could 
produce sensible qualities, and as such suffers from mind-
body epistemic problems. I then argue that ideal realism, the 
view that physical objects cannot exist unperceived, is the most 
consistent and least problematic view regarding the philosophy 
of perception. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as 
probably true on the basis of epistemic reasons alone. 
Introduction 
 The primary focus of the philosophy of perception 
is to understand the ontological nature of what it is that we 
perceive by sense. There are three main views regarding what 
the ontological nature of sense experience is, being direct 
realism, indirect realism, and ideal realism. Direct realism is 
the view that “perception is an immediate or direct awareness 
of mind-independent physical objects or events in the external 
world.” The term ‘mind-independent physical objects’ is 
synonymous with ‘material objects’. The traditional proponent 
of direct realism was Thomas Reid. Indirect realism is the view 
that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of mind-
dependent non-physical representations of mind-independent 
physical objects, and mediate or indirect awareness of mind-
independent physical objects or events in the physical world. 
The term ‘mind-dependent non-physical representations 
of mind-independent physical objects’ is synonymous with 
‘sense data’. The traditional proponents of indirect realism 
were Rene Descartes, and John Locke. Ideal realism is the 
view that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of 
mind-dependent physical objects or events. For an ideal realist, 
physical objects cannot exist unperceived, and the term ‘mind-
dependent physical objects’ is synonymous with ‘sensations’. 
The most notable ideal realist was Bishop George Berkeley.
 In this essay, I argue that ideal realism is the most 
consistent view regarding the philosophy of perception. I 
begin by defining ‘perceived by sense’, and consequently 
provide other important definitions. I proceed to argue that 
direct realism, if true, commits its holders to radical epistemic 
skepticism. I then argue that indirect realism if true commits 
its holders to radical epistemic skepticism. Lastly, I argue that 
ideal realism is more epistemically consistent than direct and 
indirect realis. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as 
probably right.
Definitions
 I understand whatever that is perceived by sense as 
properly perceived by sense, or proper objects of the senses, 
following Aristotle and George Berkeley. I define what is 
properly perceived by sense as irreducibly phenomenal, wholly 
perceptible qualities that “would have been perceived if that 
same sense had then been first conferred on us”, and things 
that are properly perceived are perceived by only one sense. 
Colors/light are thus the only proper objects of vision, sounds 
of hearing, tastes of the palate, odors of smell, and heat/
hardness/solidity of touch. Proper objects of the senses are 
also immediately perceived by the senses, and by immediately 
perceived by the senses I mean perceived without being 
perceived via suggestion, and without being inferred to exist. 
Something is perceived via suggestion if we perceive it in virtue 
of it having some habitual connection grounded on experience 
with something we immediately perceive. For example, upon 
immediately hearing the word “red”, the color red may present 
itself to our imagination. But, the color red is not perceived 
immediately by hearing, rather it is mediately apprehended 
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in virtue of the word we immediately hear, which we’ve come 
to associate with the visual color red through experience. 
Whatever is perceived via suggestion from wholly perceptible 
qualities which we immediately perceive by sense I define 
as mediately perceived. What we properly and immediately 
perceive by the senses can suggest notions (like emotions, truth, 
God, mind, and virtue) which though we’ve never properly 
and immediately perceived them, we have an understanding 
of what they are in virtue of their definitions or use in linguistic 
convention. Otherwise, what we properly and immediately 
perceive can suggest something we have previously properly and 
immediately perceived by the senses (like a sound or color), to the 
imagination- which is where all sensible things are represented- 
due to a frequently experienced connection between sensible 
qualities and notions, or between sensible qualities and other 
sensible qualities. 
From that which we properly and immediately perceive 
by the senses, we can infer the cause of our sensible qualities 
through the use of reason. Thus for a direct and indirect realist, 
they will infer that a material object is the cause of their sensible 
qualities, while for an ideal realist, they will infer some mind 
is the cause of their sensible qualities. The sensible qualities 
previously properly and immediately perceived by sense that 
are suggested to the imagination by current proper objects 
of the sense can be termed improper objects of the sense. 
Those improper objects of the sense are mediately perceived 
by sense. When we properly perceive or hear the word ‘red’ 
by sound, it may suggest to the imagination an improper 
object of sound which is some visual quality we term as red, 
though the proper object of sound is strictly what is properly 
and immediately heard. In like manner, when we see fire, in 
strictness we properly and immediately perceive only colors, 
the heat we associate with the fire is suggested to our mind 
through experience. Thus, the hotness of the fire is an improper 
object of sight, being only suggested to the imagination through 
experience, and is a proper object of touch, being felt only 
properly, and immediately by sense. Things that are perceived 
wholly by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred 
to exist, are immediately perceived by the imagination. For 
example, when I imagine a red balloon existing in front of 
my face, it is not suggested or inferred to exist, and is thus 
immediately perceived, not be sense, but by the imagination.
Physical objects must be defined such that it is agreeable 
to all three views regarding the philosophy of perception. 
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The term ‘physical object’ are often conflated with ‘material 
object’, and even often are discussed hand-in-hand: “while 
‘physicalism’ is no doubt related to ‘physics’ it is also related 
to ‘physical object’ and this in turn is very closely connected 
with ‘material object’, and via that, with ‘matter.’” My definition 
of physical objects involves two important parts. First, 
physical objects occupy the area of extended space perceived 
immediately by sense. Second, the existence of physical objects 
are not ontologically dependent on the existence of other 
physical objects. 
Physical objects occupy the mediate area of extended 
space perceived by sense, and their existence is not 
ontologically dependent on the existence of other physical 
objects for indirect realists. Sense data occupy the immediate 
area of extended space perceived by sense for indirect realists, 
but their existence is ontologically dependent on the existence 
of physical objects, and thus sense data are not physical objects. 
Physical objects occupy the immediate area of extended space 
perceived by sense, and their existence is not ontologically 
dependent on the existence of other physical objects for direct 
realists and ideal realists. For an ideal realist, however, the 
existence of physical objects is ontologically dependent on the 
existence of minds. It should be noted that objects perceived 
by the imagination are not perceived by sense, thus though I 
can imagine a red balloon occupying the visual space in front 
of me, it is perceived wholly by the imagination. I think it will 
be agreed upon on all hands that this is a neutrally acceptable 
definition of ‘physical objects’.
Direct Realism
 Direct realists believe that mind-independent physical 
objects or material objects are sometimes perceived by sense. In 
saying that material objects are sometimes perceived by sense, 
direct realists are committed to saying that material objects are 
then perceived properly, and immediately. When direct realists 
properly and immediately perceive a material object, they say 
that the material object appears, seems, or looks, sounds, tastes, 
smells, or feels a certain way to a certain person. For example, 
when a direct realist perceives an apple, they will say that they 
see a material object that looks round, and red. This apple, as it 
is in itself or objectively, can exist unperceived by any mind. 
The direct realist however cannot say that they perceive 
an apple that is round and is red without being only arbitrary. 
Without an appeal to reason, there is no non-arbitrary way to 
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claim that the senses provide us with anything but mutually 
incompatible accounts of some property of a physical object. 
The way an object looks is relative to a perceiver and thus any 
way the object looks has just as good a right to be considered 
the real way the material object is as any other way the object 
looks. But this would be absurd, a determinate and unchanging 
material object cannot be composed of mutually incompatible 
properties. If any way the material object appears to us is the 
presentation of the objective material object, we could only 
be mediately aware of it because we have to reason which 
immediately perceived appearance can exist independently of 
a perceiver. But, as direct realists are committed to the claim 
that they perceive material objects without inference, they 
cannot claim a material object is a certain way only by sense, 
because it would entail an appeal to reason or an inference, or 
else would be only arbitrary. Thus, direct realists believe that 
they perceive material objects by sense which appear a certain 
way to them, but they do not know how the material object is 
in itself objectively, when unperceived. And, whatever criterion 
the direct realist appealed to for ascertaining the true qualities 
of the physical object  could itself be challenged, for whatever 
reason one person gives seems no better than the criterion 
another gives. After all, we cannot discern whose unique 
perceptual apparatus is right for ascertaining the real qualities 
of an object, which object would appear different to everybody.
 The existence of hallucinations seems to present a 
significant challenge to anyone grappling with the philosophy 
of perception. In hallucination, what is immediately perceived 
is not a mind-independent physical object. If you were to take 
a hallucinogenic drug such as LSD, you could hallucinate 
a pink elephant existing in your visual field. Now, if I was 
suddenly bestowed with your precise perceptual faculties 
and perceptual position, perhaps because our brains/minds 
were placed in each other’s bodies, I would not experience 
pink elephants existing in my/your visual field, for I had not 
taken LSD. Thus, when we hallucinate, what we are aware of 
is not a mind-independent physical object. What we are aware 
of is something that is mind-dependent, being not perceived 
by sense, but wholly by the imagination. What we are aware 
of is then not a physical object because it does not exist in 
space. Given that we are direct realists, our hallucinations 
are therefore representations of mind-independent physical 
objects. Therefore, for direct realists, when hallucinations 
occur, what we are aware of are mind-dependent non-physical 
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representations of mind-independent physical objects which are 
perceived by the imagination. 
This is similar to the definition of sense data I gave in 
paragraph one, but subtly and importantly different. Sense data 
are immediately perceived by sense; however, hallucinations 
are not perceived by sense, they are perceived wholly by 
the imagination, and are thus immediately perceived by the 
imagination. Sense data are representations of a physical object 
existing in some relationship with their correlative sense data. 
The hallucinations we experience would not stand in such a 
relationship, the pink elephant I see while hallucinating is not a 
mental representation of a pink elephant existing roughly in the 
place I seem to see it. It seems therefore, that assuming direct 
realism is true, the existence of hallucinations is something like 
a purely mental image. When we use our imagination to picture 
a blue rectangle, there is a mental image that is a blue rectangle 
immediately perceived by the imagination. This is what a direct 
realist can say happens in cases of hallucination, we perceive 
mental images just like we do in any direct application of 
the imagination, except that it is not due to our own volition 
that the mental images in hallucinations appear to us, like the 
occurrence of mental images normally is. Rather, the application 
of our imagination during hallucinations is something similar to 
the unconscious application of our imagination in our dreams.
 Although the existence of hallucinations does not force 
the direct realist to accept the existence of sense data, like 
many philosophers have thought in the past, the existence of 
hallucinations provides a significant epistemological challenge 
for the direct realist. As Dicker put it, “the Argument from 
Hallucination… should not be regarded as an attempt to 
demonstrate that there are sense-data… the argument should 
be regarded as yet another way of calling attention… to… 
an epistemological problem concerning perception.” The 
problem becomes evident if we accept direct realism as true, 
for, anytime we perceive something, I ask, can we ever know 
if that thing is not mind-dependent? If we sometimes perceive 
things that are mind-dependent mental images, but we cannot 
distinguish them from anything we perceive in veridical 
perception without an appeal to inference, then we can never 
know that we perceive material objects, or something that is 
not wholly dependent on our mind. Further, if direct realism is 
true, the streamlined argument from perceptual relativity that I 
presented shows that whenever we do perceive material objects, 
we do not know how they are in themselves or objectively, but 
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rather, some object with we know not what qualities appears a 
certain way to us. It would seem therefore, that we never know 
if or when we perceive mind independent objects, due to the 
existence of hallucinations, and even if we did, we would not 
know what they were like, due to the existence of perceptual 
relativity. Thus, although direct realism is not metaphysically 
inconsistent, its holder is plunged into perhaps the deepest 
epistemic skepticism imaginable.
Indirect Realism
 Indirect realists believe that mind-independent physical 
objects or material objects are perceived mediately by sense, 
while only mind-dependent non-physical representations 
of these physical objects termed sense data are immediately 
perceived by sense. In saying that physical objects are 
not perceived immediately by sense, the indirect realist is 
committed to saying that material objects are justifiably inferred 
to exist from the sense data they perceive immediately. The 
supposition of sense data is supposed to help deal with the 
epistemological challenges presented to the direct realist. And, 
the supposition of the existence of mind-independent physical 
objects is supposed to make the existence of the immediate 
objects of perception (i.e. sense datum) more probable. An 
indirect realist will often infer the existence of physical objects 
in the likeness of the sense data they perceive immediately by 
sense to help explain the existence of the immediate objects of 
sense perception. When an indirect realist perceives an apple, 
they will often say that they see a sense datum that is round, 
and red, and which consequently gives them reason to suppose 
that there is a physical apple which is round, and red, that we 
perceive indirectly, insofar as it resembles its correlative sense 
datum. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, can exist 
unperceived by any mind, however the sense data cannot, as 
sense data exist necessarily in an object-perceiver relationship.
 In saying that the sense datum is round, and red, the 
indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, for the way that 
sense data seem to us is the way that they are. The indirect 
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is 
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then S 
immediately perceives a sense datum that is F.” Thus, since the 
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness and 
redness are properly perceived, and because the only things 
that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal, wholly 
perceptible qualities, the sense datum actually is round and red. 
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However, in saying that the physical object or apple is round, 
and red, the indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, as the 
indirect realist is making an inference. The indirect realist is 
reasoning that the physical object is like the sense datum which 
they perceive immediately by sense. However, the indirect 
realist is fallible in their conjecture because they do not know 
how the physical object is with certainty. They can only make 
an educated guess as to how the material object is in itself; but 
since they are not immediately aware of the physical object, 
they can never know how the object is in itself. Thus, like the 
direct realist, whatever criteria the indirect realist gives could 
itself be challenged.
 The existence of hallucinations presents a challenge to 
indirect realists, though it is less so a problem for the indirect 
realist than to a direct realist. What we are aware of in a 
hallucination is not a physical object because it does not exist 
in space. However, what we are aware of in hallucinations can 
be phenomenally indistinguishable from what we perceive in 
veridical perception. Thus, for indirect realists, without the 
application of reason it seems we cannot distinguish between 
whether we are perceiving a sense datum which represents 
a physical object by sense, or rather a hallucinatory image, 
which for an indirect realist I will call a mental image. I call 
it a mental image instead of a regular sense data because it is 
perceived wholly by the imagination, and not by sense. There 
are some who would call the objects perceived in hallucinations 
sense datum, but the term ‘sense datum’ implies that there is 
a physical object which is mediately perceived when a sense 
datum is perceived. However, during hallucination, like while 
in a dream, no physical object is perceived at all; ergo to call the 
object of perception in hallucination a sense datum would be 
erroneous. I therefore conclude that the object of hallucinatory 
perception is merely a mental image.
 The indirect realist has the advantage over the direct 
realist with regards to the existence of hallucinations because 
when indirect realists perceive something immediately, they 
can be sure that they are perceiving something immediately 
that is mind-dependent. The direct realist cannot know if 
they are perceiving something that is mind-dependent, or 
mind-independent immediately by sense, for they know 
not if they are perceiving either a physical/material object, 
or a mental image. The indirect realist, conversely, knows 
that they immediately perceive either a sense datum, or a 
mental image, both of which are dependent on the mind of the 
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perceiver. Unfortunately for the indirect realist, the existence of 
hallucinations still provides a difficult epistemic challenge that 
they must overcome. Whenever an indirect realist perceives, 
they can never know whether they perceive a physical object 
indirectly or not. Although the indirect realist knows the object 
of immediate perception is mind-dependent, and is in this sense 
in an epistemically privileged position in relation to a direct 
realist, they know not if there is really an object of mediate 
perception, i.e. a physical object in its place, wherever that may 
be.
 The indirect realist is, like the direct realist, bogged 
with at least two severe, epistemic, perceptual problems. In the 
first place, the indirect realist can never know whether they are 
perceiving a physical, material object or not due to the existence 
of hallucinations. Although the indirect realist can be certain 
that the direct or immediate object of perception will always be 
mind-dependent, they can never know if they perceive an object 
that exists independently of sense perception or not. Secondly, 
even if the indirect realism was true and we could sometimes 
infer the existence of material objects we perceive mediately, 
we could never know with certainty what the physical object 
looked like. 
Berkeley also pointed out that an indirect realist does 
not know how mind-independent (material) objects could 
produce mind-dependent qualities (sense datum). Neither do 
we know how material objects could act upon mind, nor do we 
know how a mind-independent object could imprint a sense 
datum on our mind, especially if the sense datum is not like 
the object. Further, we would have the same reason to believe a 
material object exists whether it did or not, as is evident by the 
existence of hallucinations or dreams. It seems therefore, that 
the existence of sensible qualities is not better explained by the 
existence of mediately perceived material objects, because an 
indirect realist does not know how a material object could cause 
sense data. The problems of perception and mind seem to make 
indirect realism epistemically unattractive.
Ideal Realism
Ideal realists believe that everything that is perceived 
are ideas, which exist only in the mind. I define ideas as 
irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible, mind-dependent 
qualities. Ideas are perfectly known, as they contain nothing 
in them besides for how they appear to our mind. However, 
there are two types of ideas, being mind-dependent physical 
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objects termed ‘sensations’ or ‘real things’ which are perceived 
by sense, and mind-dependent non-physical representations 
of mind-dependent physical objects termed ‘thoughts’ or 
‘images of things’, or ‘mental images’ which are perceived 
by the imagination. Sensations or real things are properly 
and immediately perceived, being imprinted on the senses. 
Thoughts or images of things are either immediately, or 
mediately perceived, being perceived mediately by the senses 
or immediately by the imagination. When thoughts are 
suggested to the imagination by sensations which are properly 
and immediately perceived, they are mediately and improperly 
perceived by sense, and represented by the imagination. 
When thoughts are not suggested to the imagination, but are 
perceived wholly by the imagination, they are immediately 
perceived by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred 
to exist. Thus, when an ideal realist perceives an apple, they will 
say that they see a sensation or physical object that is round, 
and red. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, cannot exist 
unperceived by any mind. 
 In saying that the apple is round, and red, the ideal 
realist is not being arbitrary. The way that physical objects 
appear for ideal realists is the way that they are. The ideal 
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is 
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then 
S immediately perceives a sensation that is F.” Thus, since the 
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness 
and redness are properly perceived, and because the only 
things that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal, 
wholly perceptible qualities, the apple actually is round and 
red. Ideal realists therefore believe that they perceive sensations 
by sense which appear a certain way to them, and this is 
how the physical object is in itself or objectively, because all 
physical objects are the way that they appear to us. Thus, for 
an ideal realist, there is no problem of perceptual relativity, for 
everything that is perceived is an idea that is a certain way, 
unlike a direct realist who can never tell when they perceive 
the true qualities of the object, and unlike an indirect realist 
who can never tell to what extent, or even if their sense data 
resembles its correspondent object.
 The existence of hallucinations presents an epistemic 
challenge to ideal realists similar to the indirect realist, but 
it is less significant of a problem for ideal realists than it is 
for the indirect or the direct realist. What we are aware of in 
hallucinations is not a physical object because it does not exist 
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in immediate extended space. However, what we are aware 
of in hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable from 
what we perceive in veridical perception. Thus, for ideal 
realists, without the application of fallible reason, it seems 
we cannot distinguish between whether we are perceiving a 
physical object or sensation by sense, or rather a hallucinatory 
thought by the imagination. 
 Like the indirect realist, the ideal realist can always 
know that the immediate object of perception is mind-
dependent. However, the existence of hallucinations is less 
of a problem for the ideal realist than for the direct and 
indirect realists because direct and indirect realists can never 
be sure if they perceive something that can exist wholly 
unperceived at all. When a hallucinogenic sensible quality 
is perceived, something that is exclusively mind-dependent 
is perceived, as opposed to in veridical perception. But 
sometimes hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable 
from veridical perception. Thus, direct and indirect realists 
could never know if they perceive something that can exist 
wholly unperceived, regardless of it being perceived directly 
or indirectly. However, for ideal realists, they can always be 
sure that they perceive nothing that is mind independent, for 
ideal realists only perceive ideas, and ideas are wholly mind 
dependent qualities. And, although ideal realists may have 
difficulty distinguishing sensations from thoughts without the 
use of reason, they still know that however they are appeared 
to by ideas is how that idea really is, for the existence of an idea 
consists wholly in its being perceived.
Conclusion
 Although the existence of hallucinations provides an 
epistemic challenge to ideal realists, it is negligible compared 
to the epistemic challenge it provides to direct and indirect 
realists. Further, the epistemic challenge provided by the 
existence of perceptual relativity makes direct and indirect 
realism look further unattractive. That is because direct and 
indirect realists can never know how physical objects really 
are, even if and when they are perceived. This same point does 
not apply to ideal realists, who are aware of the way physical 
objects are when they are perceived. There is thus no problem 
of perceptual relativity for an ideal realist, for their ideas 
are perfectly known. Lastly, indirect realists have epistemic 
concerns regarding the mind body problem that appear 
impossibly to remedy. I conclude my essay by saying that if we 
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look at the facts, ideal realism provides the most consistent and 
least paradoxical view regarding epistemic knowledge and the 
philosophy of perception, and as such should be considered 
more likely true. 
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Virtuous Civic Friendships: An 
Alternative Interpretation of Aristotle’s 
Theory of Political Friendship  
Kiley Komro
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies three 
categories of friendship: friendships  of utility, pleasure, and 
virtue. He further argues that friendships are a necessary part 
of the  eudaimon life for people (1155a) as well as a relevant 
aspect of a successful and unified polity,  for they serve the 
legislators’ goal to “expel civil conflict” and promote justice 
(1155a25). The  question arises as to what type of friendship 
best characterizes such ‘civic friendship.’ Many  scholars, 
including Sibyl Schwartzenbach in her paper “On Civic 
Friendships,” take Aristotle to  argue that political friendships 
are friendships of utility (105). However, I will argue that a 
more  appropriate interpretation of Aristotle’s work indicates 
that political friendship is actually a virtue  friendship. Since 
Aristotle clearly considers cultivating virtue to be a significant 
part of a  legislator’s role in a polis, I will argue that it clearly 
follows that legislators must not only tend to  concord and 
justice between the citizens, but also, to foster the best sort 
of friendship between  citizens. Lastly, I will consider certain 
aspects of the United States current political climate to  show 
the danger of deflating civic friendship to a relationship 
grounded solely on utility.  
I. Schwartzenbach’s View of Civic Friendship as Utility 
Friendship  
Schwarzenbach, in her paper “On Civic Friendship,” 
argues that modern political thought  seems to have 
abandoned Aristotle’s premise that a thriving political society 
is characterized by  friendship between citizens among 
themselves and between leaders and their populace. She  
states that “a plethora of views on the problem of political 
unity… barely mention friendship  or else explicitly reject it as 
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a serious contender.” Schwarzenbach hopes to counteract this  
development by arguing that “political friendship emerges 
as a necessary condition for genuine  justice” and a unified 
“modern state” (98). 
Schwarzenbach begins her argument by offering 
an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of  friendship. She 
argues that all types of friendship, including “both pleasure 
and [utility]  friendships for Aristotle necessarily retain the 
aspect of wishing the other well for that other’s  own sake” 
(100). She further argues that even friendships where “one 
loves the other friend  under some particular and limited 
description only,” such as advantage or utility friendship, the  
object of the friends’ love is the other person (100). However, 
if this is the case, she still must  offer a description to save 
Aristotle’s distinction between utility, pleasure, and virtue  
friendships. She accomplishes this by arguing that “what in fact 
distinguishes virtue  friendship from the other two kinds is, 
rather, that the description under which one loves the  other is 
a description of that other’s whole (or near whole) character” 
(100).  
All of Schwarzenbach’s analyses are directed at 
justifying an expansive reading of  advantage or utility 
friendships so that her underlying assumption that civic 
friendships are of  that type becomes more palatable. Her 
overall goal is to argue that the political unity necessary to  
reclaim our overly partisan modern state can be achieved 
through a “political friendship, that is,  the traits of mutual 
awareness, of wishing the other well for their own sake, and 
of doing things  for the civic friend are still retained… [and] 
evidenced in a general concern ” (105). However, I  argue that 
her interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the three types of 
friendship and her  categorization of civic friendship is not 
strongly supported by the text. Instead, her claims that  civic 
friendship is characterized by mutual valuing of other citizens 
for themselves would be  better supported by an interpretation 
of Aristotle that places civic friendship in the category of  virtue 
friendships.  
II. Virtue Friendships 
Like Schwarzenbach, I think that political unity is 
best served by relationships between  citizens founded on an 
appreciation of each other’s value as a person and a desire that 




analysis of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , I  find substantive 
evidence that somewhat contradicts Schwarzenbach’s claim that 
the quality of  ‘valuing the friend for themselves’ is to be found 
in all types of friendships. Beginning with his  classification of 
the types of friendships, Aristotle states that the types of love 
are distinguished  by “the three objects of love. For each object 
of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving”  (1156a7). I 
take this to mean that utility friendships are those in which the 
object of love is not  the person themselves, nor the description 
under which the person themselves is loved as  Schwarzenbach 
interpreted. Instead, the object of love is that aspect of the 
person that the friend  finds useful, or perhaps even the services 
the friend provides. Furthermore, in utility friendships  the 
friends do not wish goods on the other for their own sake, 
rather “those who love each other  wish goods to each other 
[only] insofar as they love each other. Those who love each 
other for  utility love the other not in his own right, but insofar 
as they gain some good for themselves from  him” (1156a10). 
Aristotle writes further that “those who love for utility or 
pleasure, then, are  fond of a friend because of what is good or 
pleasant for themselves, not insofar as the beloved is  who he 
is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant” (1156a15). Thus, we 
must search for another  explanation for how civic friendships 
contain the qualities of valuing the friend for themselves  and 
their characters, and wish goods for their friend’s own sake as 
both Schwarzenbach and I  believe they do.  
Now that we can set aside utility and pleasure 
friendships as contenders for the  categorization of civic 
friendships, I will turn to the remaining type: virtue 
or character  friendships. Aristotle argues that virtue 
friendships have three main features: they are between 
equals (1157b37, 1158b), each friend values the other for 
themselves and their whole character  (1157b2), and each 
friend wants good things for the other, for the other’s sake 
(1155b28). He  considers these types of friendships the most 
complete and friendship-like friendship there is.  The other 
types of friendships are sometimes said to merely “[bear] 
some resemblance to this  complete sort” (1157a). There is 
one additional qualification of these friendships: “complete  
friendship is the friendship of good people similar in 
virtue….Hence these people’s friendship  lasts as long as 
they are good; and virtue is enduring” (1156b7).  
Virtue friendships are overall the best friendships, 
according to Aristotle. Such friends  value the other for 
themselves and their characters. As such, they are willing to 
do the work  necessary to preserve and maintain their friend’s 
virtues (11596). Altogether, it seems that virtue  friendships 
serve the goals of Schwarzenbach’s civic friendships more 
clearly in the text.  However, it remains to be seen whether 
Aristotle would see it that way. In my next section, I 
will  advance my argument that Aristotle too would have 
categorized civic friendships as virtue  friendships, or at the 
very least, more like virtue friendships than utility friendships. 
 III. Virtuous Civic Friendships and Concord  
It is clear throughout the sections on friendship in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle  sees friendship as an integral 
part of a successful political society. He states that “friendship  
would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem 
to be more concerned about it  than about justice” because 
good friends won’t need justice and regulations from political 
leaders  in order to do right by their fellow citizens (1155a25). 
Though it is clear Aristotle believes in a  sort of civic friendship, 
he does not state clearly how to classify it according to his 
three kinds of  friendship or whether it forms an independent 
type of friendship altogether. However, in considering his 
description of concord, I argue that virtue friendship would 
best characterize  civic friendship.  
Aristotle states that “concord would seem to be similar 
to friendship” (1155a25). Indeed,  he goes farther by arguing 
that “a city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree 
on what is  advantageous, make the same decision, and act on 
their common resolution” (1167a25).  Furthermore, “concord, 
then, is apparently [civic] friendship… for it is concerned 
with  advantage and with what affects life [as a whole]” 
(1167b, brackets in original). At first glance,  this statement 
would seem to indicate that concord, and the friendship it 
implies, is a relationship  based on mutual utility. I argue that 
this interpretation is incorrect for in the next breath, Aristotle  
claims that “concord is found in decent people…. They 
wish for what is just and advantageous,  and also seek it in 
common” (1167b5) and that “base people, however, cannot be 
in concord”  (1167b10). Therefore, base people, or unvirtuous 
people, cannot develop civic friendships. From these, it seems 
quite clear that concord, or civic friendships, must be a sort 




is inappropriately conflating ‘advantage’ with  ‘utility’. In the 
context of the above passage, the advantage that is discussed 
is not for some  immediate good for an individual such as 
would be served by utility. Rather, it deals with an  advantage 
that is held in common, shared between the various citizens. 
Additionally, the  advantage mentioned is that which “affects 
life [as a whole]” (1167b, brackets in original) which  more 
appropriately refers to the advantages of a whole life well lived 
with virtue.  
Additional evidence for my argument that civic 
friendships are virtue friendships can be  found earlier 
in the text. To clarify the statement that civic friendships 
are founded on  advantage, I’ll briefly discuss the type 
of advantage specific to civic society. In a political  
community, Aristotle writes that citizens and legislators 
“aim not at some advantage close at  hand, but at 
advantage for the whole of life” (1160a20). Advantage for 
the whole life, I would  argue could roughly correspond 
to the good. The good, as we know from the rest of 
Nicomachean Ethics, is achieved through a whole long life 
(1100a7) of activity in accordance  with virtue (1099a15) 
accompanied by sufficient external goods (1099a30) and 
friends  (1170b17).  
Furthermore, cultivating virtues within their citizens 
seems to be part of the excellence of  the legislator. Aristotle 
wrote “it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve 
[the good] for… people and for cities” (1094b10), and “the 
goal of political science [is] the best good; and most  of its 
attention is devoted to the character of the citizens, to make 
them good people who do fine  actions” (1099b30). Clearly, 
there is a relationship between legislators’ goals to promote 
concord,  chase away enmity between citizens, and develop 
their virtue. With legislators necessarily  preoccupied with 
habituating good character, it seems right that the friendships 
that develop  between such citizens would recognize the 
value of their counterparts as tied up with their virtue.  I see 
a strong connection with the legislators’ responsibility to tend 
to the virtues of the citizens  and their other roles around 
producing advantageous conditions for people’s whole lives 
and their  goal of producing concord. Each of these goals feed 
into one another. Thus, it seems quite fitting  to categorize 
the relationships between citizens on a horizontal axis, and 
between citizens and  their legislators on a vertical axis, as 
virtue friendships.  
IV. Legislators’ Responsibility for Civic Virtue and 
Concord: Worries About American  Politics  
Considering politics today, it is quite obvious that 
people care about the ethical characters  of their fellow citizens. 
Citizens worry about the questionably moral choices of their 
elected officials–vote trading, bailouts to big corporations over 
small businesses, and campaigns marked  by big-spender 
schmoozing. On top of these activities between legislators, 
newspaper opinion  columns are replete with editorials 
lamenting the rise of rancorous partisanship, especially in the  
wake of the 2016 and 2020 elections. It seems quite obvious that 
the United States has lost even  the semblance of civic unity 
or agreement over what is advantageous for the nation as a 
whole. I  argue that this situation may stem, at least in part, 
from an abdication of responsibility by our  leaders to “aim 
at concord among all, while they try above all to expel civil 
conflict, which is  enmity” (1155a25). While citizens seem to 
care increasingly about their fellow citizens’ moral  character, 
legislators seem to have set aside any hope of developing any 
kind of relationship  among citizens marked by mutual valuing 
of another for themselves.  
Congress has done little to catalyze an appreciation 
among citizens of their common good  and common goals. Not 
only have they failed to address the rising partisanship among 
the  populace, they seem to fuel it with rhetoric saturated with 
political rage and revolving around  stimulating contempt and 
partisan enmity. Some elected officials, like retiring senator 
Tom  Udall, have raised concerns about “a culture [that] valued 
partisanship over the country’s best  interests” (Broadwater). 
I think that many of us are tired of the discord and contempt 
that marks  our political relationships. I believe that one 
possible solution to these attitudes is a shift from  thinking of 
our fellow citizens as means to our individual advantage to 
an appreciation of them  as people who are valuable in and of 
themselves.  
In most modern liberal democracies and republics, 
there is an underlying doctrine of  viewpoint neutrality–that 
a precondition for living together in a diverse nation is in part  
contingent on one’s fellow citizens minding their own business 
on certain (sometimes moral,  especially religious) matters. 




forming character friendships between citizens. However, 
that would be a subject for further questioning.  Altogether, 
if politicians and ordinary people could begin to cultivate 
relationships even at the  local or community level founded 
on desiring the good things in life for their neighbors because  
they are good neighbors, a new culture of unity could arise.  
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Practical Identity and Forms of Life: An 





 This paper offers an account of the possibility for 
a system of normative ethics in a later Wittgensteinean 
epistemological context. By adopting a viewpoint of ethics as 
fundamentally grounded in ‘practical identities’ as the source 
of normative obligations in a manner expressed by thinkers 
such as Christine Korsgaard, the paper attempts to clarify and 
surpass the quietist and unanalyzable ethical account given 
by Wittgenstein himself. Such an approach based on identity 
largely mirrors the normative possibilities in speech offered 
by ‘forms of life’ in Philosophical Investigations by offering 
in-context, normatively rich frameworks in which ethical 
statements can be adequately and normatively assessed. 
Such a viewpoint accounts for the accepted disagreement in 
Wittgenstein’s ethical thoughts by showing the in-context, 
identity-based ‘form of life’ differences that lead to acceptable 
ethical divergence, while also opening up room for semi-
universal bedrock ethical statements that all humans in a 
given social community necessarily are subject to due to 
the basic identities implied in being a human being for their 
community. Such an account introduces more clarity to the way 
that ethical deliberation and disagreement takes shape from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective.
Introduction
 In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein destroys the 
determinacy of meaning in language that was and seemingly 
still is taken as a given by most people when thinking 
philosophically, creating a great skeptical problem for anyone 
wanting to adequately communicate with those around them.  
Luckily for anyone who wants to use language, Wittgenstein 
believes that there is a social solution to this problem and 
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seems to claim that normative standards for meaning in 
language do exist. There are various interpretations of exactly 
what Wittgenstein’s solution involves, but at its base it goes 
something like this: “Although there may not be a deeply 
philosophically analyzable absolute meaning of any given 
sentence, when used in practice by members of a shared social 
community, the terms gain normative meaning.”  Thus, the 
members of a community can communicate with each-other, 
and in those contexts, there are normative standards of correct 
and incorrect usages of language.
 Although Wittgenstein believed in limited normativity 
in the meaning of language, he never gave a clear account 
of his ethical beliefs and specifically opposed any attempts 
to create systems of ethics. Creating a system of ethics 
seems to be an attempt to apply a rigid, constricting lens 
onto a linguistic landscape incapable of handling such 
rigidity. Thus, Wittgenstein only ever comments on ethics 
as being an extremely personal subject, and a subject about 
which great variation is to be accepted. As Anne-Marie 
Christensen describes it, to Wittgenstein, a person’s “ethical 
attitude” is “a form of personal worldview.” These personal 
ethical worldviews may differ, and they may even differ 
fundamentally. If they do differ, there is no sure way to resolve 
the difference, as there is no shared standard to which they can 
appeal; it is simply a clash between worldviews. 
 This account of moral disagreement leaves 
Wittgenstein’s account of ethical disagreement in a position 
somewhat similar to his account of the interactions between 
separate linguistic communities. To Wittgenstein, determinacy 
in language use only exists within the bounds of a specific 
community. Thus, the way in which what is true and untrue 
about the world is decided necessarily resides within 
communities as well. There is no external measure to appeal 
to. Nevertheless, when two linguistic communities meet, it 
is possible that one community might critique the beliefs of 
the other as inaccurate. It is even possible that a group would 
internally critique itself, as has happened numerous times 
in scientific and cultural revolutions. In these revolutions, 
core assumptions about the way that things work have been 
challenged and flipped on their heads. It seems that ethical 
disagreement between two individuals for Wittgenstein lies in a 
similar position. The disagreeing people simply have disparate 
worldviews. 
 From these disparate worldviews, meaningful 
Practical Identity and Forms of Life
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critique can happen. Wittgenstein even gives examples of 
such discussions in an ethical context.  That said, how such 
meaningful critique is resolved goes unanswered, despite the 
fact that it does, in fact, often resolve itself. There is nothing 
in Wittgenstein’s philosophical arsenal (ethical or linguistic) 
that can help us understand what might happen when two 
members of separate linguistic communities or two people 
with different ethical worldviews interact. There is no separate, 
crystalline fact of the matter that they could appeal to in order 
to resolve their disagreement. This lack is already worrying 
to what we intuitively feel should be the case in interactions 
between communities about scientific matters of fact, but in the 
ethical scenario between two members of the same community 
such a conclusion feels almost unacceptable. To have ethical 
disagreement between two very close people shrouded in 
such epistemic fog seems like it might be giving up more than 
is needed and obscuring what is a coherent, if a bit difficult, 
process for those involved.
 In this paper, I will present a potential solution to this 
problem. This solution will build a conception of moral decision 
making using the concept of ‘practical identity’ provided by 
Christine Korsgaard as an analogue to Wittgenstein’s forms of 
life which he employs to understand normativity in general uses 
of language. Such an approach might help in resolving some of 
Wittgenstein’s ethical indeterminacy. Additionally, it will give a 
useful analytic lens to understand both personal moral conflicts 
and ethical disagreement. Using this lens, moral deliberation 
and disagreement is revealed as not a vague interaction of 
viewpoints clashing with each other that mysteriously and 
inexplicably resolves itself, but rather a negotiation of identities 
for the person/s involved.
Practical Identity
 At the core of Korsgaard’s ethical theory is the claim 
that all obligations are fundamentally a response to a threat 
against one or more of our identities. These identities are what 
Korsgaard calls “practical identities,” meaning that they aren’t 
based on some deep metaphysical claim of identity as a thing 
existing from a third person perspective and informed by the 
Scientific World View, but rather a practical account of the way 
that we experience deliberation from a first person perspective. 
Regardless and independent of the existence or nonexistence 
from a third-person perspective of some idealized Cartesian 
self, the reality of our lived first person decision-making process 
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is that “it is as if there were something over and above all of 
your desires, something that is you, and that [deliberates and] 
chooses which [desire] to act on.” It is this non-metaphysical, 
practical you that makes up your overarching practical identity 
as a person.
 Such an approach of establishing practical identities 
may seem like it does not mesh well with a Wittgensteinian 
account of things. It may seem like it relies too much on some 
a priori method of speculative reasoning that fails the test of 
the private language argument (which I will explain shortly) 
for lacking a criterion of correctness. This, however, is not 
the case. In this argument, it seems to me that Korsgaard is 
actually making a somewhat Wittgensteinian argument against 
the classical Cartesian view of the self while simultaneously 
maintaining the the deliberative agent self as a practically, 
although not necessarily metaphysically, existent identity. 
 Obviously, the classical Cartesian view of the self is 
flawed from a Wittgensteinian perspective; it posits a dualist 
account of the world that quite blatantly assumes the existence 
of a deeply and inherently private view of a self fundamentally 
inaccessible to others. This conception fails the test presented 
by Wittgenstein’s private language argument. According 
to the private language argument, this self could not really 
communicate with itself in such a private way, as would be no 
external criterion of correctness it can appeal to. To illustrate 
this, look at what we might normally do to see whether we’re 
right or not. Say I want to know what the date is. Since we 
are currently in a 2020 COVID world and the days all blend 
together, I’m not 100% sure if my disposition to guess that 
it’s December 19th is correct, so I decide to check the calendar 
on my phone. After checking the calendar, I realize that I 
am wrong. It is, in fact, December 20th. I needed an external 
criterion of correctness to compare my internal disposition 
to, or else I wouldn’t really know what was right. From this 
base, Wittgenstein argues that such a private definition cannot 
function. All that such a private definition could possibly 
give would be a measure of whether the person who gave 
the definition feels that they are using the term properly. That 
isn’t much of a standard for truth at all; it’s not verifiable. All 
real truth claims require an outside criterion of correctness 
with which they can check. Thus, the metaphysically dualist 
Cartesian account of selfhood is doomed to fail should we 
accept Wittgenstein’s critique of private languages.
 In contrast, Korsgaard’s account treats our decision 
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making process as a fundamentally public and practical 
matter. Korsgaard points out that we do, in fact, experience 
a deliberative process as agents, one that is unified by our 
identity and fundamentally relies on language as a tool for 
representing our reasons. We do, in fact, order, encourage, 
blame, obey, and punish ourselves, as Wittgenstein points 
out. Our inner monologue is not simply real: it is also public. 
If we were to share the language that we use with ourselves 
in our deliberative process with others, they would be able 
to understand it. Such a process is not a private one in the 
sense of a private language, but merely in the sense that it is 
a negotiation between parts of ourselves. We may or may not 
choose to share this process with other people, but it happens 
nonetheless using a publicly available language and employs 
publicly shareable reasons. To deny that this account of identity 
and agency is resting on an inherently public base would be 
to deny that the reasons we use to justify our decisions are 
public as well, which is blatantly false when further considered. 
The deliberative process is inherently one of negotiation with 
ourselves, and we can all explain our reasons as to why we 
make the decisions we deliberated over. The results of this 
personal deliberation provides us with reasons that we can and 
do regularly share. I can explain my reasoning for a decision I 
make to anyone, and although they might not agree with me, 
we can certainly expect that they will understand me.
Identities of Obligation
 In addition to having a single overarching practical 
identity as a given individual, each individual also has many 
smaller identities. Contingent practical identities such as ‘sister,’ 
‘doctor,’ or ‘Austrian citizen’ each come with their own socially-
determined reasons to do certain things and not do others. 
A good doctor ought to spend time developing their medical 
knowledge and ought not to harm their patient, for example. 
 Everyone also necessarily shares their identity as 
deliberative and social beings who need the social context 
provided by their contingent identities to motivate their 
decisions and live a meaningful life. In our specific case, this 
identity can be referred to as our human identity. This human 
identity, being the base upon which our other identities stand, 
also provides normative force to our other, contingent identities. 
Additionally, it can not be given up without dire consequences, 
as to give it up would be to give up our capability for identity 
and thus deprive us of our reasons for action. This is why 
we might say that someone “lost themselves” in rage if they 
kill someone in a murder of passion; they have temporarily 
snapped out of their identity as human. Other identities can 
also approach a similar level of importance in our lives when 
we become very attached to them. Someone might choose to 
die rather than betray their country’s interests because to do 
so would be to forsake a national identity that they’ve made 
so core to their being that dying is preferable to betraying 
it. Ethical decision-making then involves the deliberative 
negotiation between our identities and the situations and 
urges we face in living our lives. For example, a man might 
face a conflict of identity when his family refuses to invite his 
boyfriend to a family gathering due to their bigoted beliefs 
around sexuality. In this situation, the man must decide 
between an obligation from his identity as a member of his 
family and an obligation from his identity as a lover and a gay 
man (among others). 
 If someone makes decisions that clash with one of their 
identities, then that identity is threatened. If they either make 
enough decisions against that identity, or a decision that directly 
rules out that identity, then they lose the identity completely. 
For an example of losing the identity through making enough 
decisions against it, imagine someone who identifies as a 
tea enthusiast. If that person suddenly starts choosing coffee 
over tea every morning for a week, then their identity as a tea 
enthusiast is threatened, and they and the people around them 
might start questioning it. “Hey,” a friend might say, “Why did 
you stop drinking tea all of the sudden? You drank it every 
morning before last week!” If such behavior continues for six 
months, then calling that person a tea enthusiast seems to no 
longer be applicable, and a friend might call them out on it if 
they still insist that they are. “I haven’t seen you drink tea in 
half a year with no good excuse! How can you still claim to be a 
tea enthusiast!” An example of a decision that instantly destroys 
an identity might be one of someone identifying as a member 
of their school’s board game club. If they quit the club, then that 
identity is instantly destroyed. In almost all cases, it would be 
incorrect to continue claiming that you’re a part of board game 
club if you’ve formally quit, and the people around them could 
also call them out on that. “Stop saying you’re a part of the 
board game club! You told everyone you quit!”
 As you can see by these examples, identities are 
fundamentally public entities. In the social contexts where 
a given set of identities is used, they have their meaning by 
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dint of the standards set within that social context, and there 
are normative standards one must achieve in order to claim 
membership in those identity groups. In a society without 
music, you cannot identify as a musician. Similarly, the honor 
code of a knight during the Middle Ages will be different than 
the honor code of a baseball player in our modern day, even 
though they would likely both identify as honorable. The 
existence of these identities is determined by the shared social 
world in which they’re used. The contents of these identities 
(i.e. the reasons and obligations they give you), as well as the 
criterion under which you can claim ownership to them is 
mediated through this inherently public social lens as well.
 Korsgaard employs this account of practical identity 
to offer a compelling Kantian account of what such decision-
making necessarily looks like. That said, Korsgaard employs 
many claims that a Wittgensteinian perspective might reject in 
constructing her account of morality building off of this base. 
Regardless, the starting point of practical identity itself is really 
what has important implications for pulling back a bit at some 
of the vagueness present in Wittgenstein’s account of morality. 
Non-Kantian approaches could certainly be built from the base 
of obligation that the conception of practical identity provides.
Identities and Forms of Life
 One of the terms often discussed in explanations of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of linguistic normativity is the 
term Lebensform, or “form of life.” Although Wittgenstein 
himself doesn’t use the term to any truly great extent, it is an 
illuminating term for understanding the type of scenarios in 
which a language has normative meaning. To Wittgenstein, 
language only gains normative meaning within a given 
embodied context. Here’s how I like to think of it: language 
cannot be understood in isolation, but requires two levels 
of context. The first context is a social one. You must be 
indoctrinated into a community that speaks a shared language 
in shared contexts before you can adequately understand the 
language in use. The second context is a teleological one. You 
must employ the language in a specific context of use before 
it can be adequately understood. Both of these contexts are 
intertwined, with no hard barrier between them. You cannot 
understand any given use of language without both.
 An example of a form of life can be seen in the 
institution of a grocery store and the many activities that you 
engage in within it. For example, imagine a woman bringing 
her big cart of items to the checkout lane. In the cart, she has 
oats from the bulk section, some produce, and tofu. She begins 
placing her items on the conveyor belt, and eventually the 
cashier gets to her oats and asks her “What’s the code for that?” 
The woman replies “GE30.” This situation requires both that 
the woman buying groceries and the cashier have the cultural 
knowledge of how supermarkets work, the process of checking 
out, and the special process of exchanging codes for items from 
the bulk section in order to understand how the language is to 
be used in that specific situation. In a different situation with 
different context, such language would have absolutely no 
meaning, or a completely different one. Asking “What’s the 
code for that?” has completely different meaning as a software 
programmer, or a spy learning how to communicate using 
a cypher. Without knowing the specific context, you cannot 
understand the specific utterances and follow the language 
game properly. These cultural and teleological contexts are 
what make up forms of life.
 Wittgenstein’s example of a language game between two 
builders in section two of Philosophical Investigations can also 
be analyzed from this form of life perspective. In the example, 
two people are conversing in a very simple language consisting 
solely of words of construction materials, such as ‘slab.’ One 
builder will yell ‘slab!’ at the other, and the other builder will go 
and fetch them a slab. The language of Wittgenstein’s builders 
from section two has meaning in part because they’re using it in 
the context of a specific activity. That said, if you take one of the 
builders out and replace them with someone without the social 
conditioning and training to be a member of their construction-
worker community, they won’t have the social context to know 
what’s going on and understand the teleological context they’ve 
been placed in. If you lack a part of the context required to 
participate in the form of life that a language is being used in, 
then you won’t be able to adequately understand the use of 
language you’re engaging in. For Wittgenstein, language is to 
be understood in use.
 In the case of the builders, the fact that they live in a 
form of life as members in a construction-worker community 
seems to express nearly the same meaning as saying that 
they are construction workers. It is their entrance into that 
community that allows them to identify as construction 
workers, and people who can properly assert that they hold the 
identity of construction worker can reasonably be expected to 
understand the language games that construction workers play. 
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Identity, in the sense of practical identity as given by Korsgaard, 
seems to bear resemblance to the concept of a form of life. Our 
practical identities give us structure around which we can 
shape the contours of our life, they give us reasons to make 
both mundane and profound decisions in our life, and they 
give us boundaries within which we must mostly abide unless 
we want to feel the guilt of losing our sense of self. They give 
us teleological reasons that we should strive for and a social 
context in which we live. In a quite real sense, our identities 
express the literal form that our life takes.
Ethical Theories
 As forms of life give normativity to language, so too 
can identities give normativity to ethical expression and 
ethical language. Although such a conception of identity as 
the normative scope through which we can evaluate language 
would necessarily seem to create a theory of ethics, something 
Wittgenstein was quite blatantly against, the rigidity of 
the system springing from this theory is not extreme. In 
many cases, the account offered by Wittgenstein of differing 
worldviews does not greatly differ from such an identity-based 
account. That said, the lens of identity can offer more clarity to 
the situation.
 To illuminate this, let’s take a look at an example used 
by Christensen in her account of Wittgenstein’s ethics taken 
from a conversation between Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees. In 
their conversation, Wittgenstein and Rhees discuss “a man ‘who 
has come to the conclusion that he must either leave his wife 
or abandon his work within cancer research.’” Wittgenstein 
responds: “[s]uppose I am his friend, and I say to him ‘look, 
you’ve taken this girl out of her home, and now, by God, you 
must stick to her.’ This would be called taking up an ethical 
attitude.”  He also notes that the man might respond “but what 
of suffering humanity? how [sic] can I abandon my research?” 
Wittgenstein even notes that the man might consider his wife 
“’It probably won’t be fatal for her. She’ll get over it, probably 
marry again,’ and so on.” All of these are referring to different 
‘ethical attitudes’ that the man could take up in defending his 
actions, and Wittgenstein is okay with that. 
 All of these ‘ethical attitudes’ are just as easily expressed 
in terms of identity. In the first case, Wittgenstein is appealing 
to the man’s identity as a husband and the duties that come 
with marriage. In the second case, the man is responding with 
the reasons given to him by his identity as a cancer scientist and 
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someone whose work brings good into the world. In the final 
case, the man is qualifying the harm done to his wife by arguing 
that she can handle the destruction of her identity as his wife. 
To Wittgenstein, all of these responses are theoretically valid, 
and under an identity-based system they are as well. As we can 
see here, although a practical-identity based theory of ethics is 
certainly a theory, its system need not be excessively rigid in its 
reach. Each of these identities place valid claims on the scientist 
in question. The ‘theory’ I offer in this paper is really more a 
method to add more clarity to the nature of Wittgensteinian 
ethics than any substantive change in the contents of it. 
 Nonetheless, there are places where a practical-identity 
based system of ethics does impose seemingly universal rules 
upon us, and those cases come into play when our identity as 
human is threatened by an action that we might take. To give 
up our identity as human would be to give up our very nature 
as a social, deliberative animal in need of having socially-
defined identities which obligate and motivate us. To give up 
our human identity would be to give up the base groundwork 
that enables us to exist and be ethical creatures in the first place. 
It is thus impossible to give up our human identity without 
in some moral way dying and losing our membership in our 
community. The standards set by this identity as human are 
the ethical standards accepted as so right that to question them 
would be crazy, and to act against them would be to commit an 
‘inhuman’ deed.
Non-negotiable Obligation
 One example of such a non-negotiable, ‘human’ 
obligation would Korsgaard’s account of a conflict between 
one’s identity as a solider and their identity as human. While a 
good soldier should follow the orders of their superiors, a good 
human should not murder the innocent. In such a situation, the 
identity of humanity overrides any contingent identity, as to 
lose it would be to lose the self. 
 The identity as human could be considered as giving 
us a group of unquestionable, certain statements from a 
Wittgensteinean point of view presented in On Certainty. Such 
certain statements are basic assumptions that we act on in 
normal life, and it does not make sense to doubt them in almost 
all contexts. The identity of human comprises obligations so 
basic and fundamental to our conceptions of morality that they 
are unquestioned for most people outside of truly exceptional 
circumstances. For example, behaviors like killing another 
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human being for fun or causing completely arbitrary harm to a 
person can be quite simply taken as bedrock immoral actions in 
our society. These statements could be questioned theoretically, 
but practically are taken as a given. In the process of ethical 
deliberation with someone who tried to question one of  these 
bedrock statements of ethical life, many would simply dismiss 
them as insane.
 Imagine, for example, two people entering an ethical 
debate about the permissibility of some hotly debated topic, 
say the practice of eating meat. Perhaps the argument of the 
person insisting that people should not eat meat may take 
Peter Singer’s perspective and explain that animals are sentient 
beings just like us who can experience pain just like we do, 
and that we have no good reasons to inflict such pain on those 
other animals. From an identity perspective, this could be seen 
as appealing to our identity as a sentient being who also avoids 
pain. If their interlocutor were to simply respond “Well, I don’t 
see anything wrong with causing pain to other human people 
anyways, why should I care about animals’ pain?”, then the 
conversation would be brought to a standstill. Their argument 
is inhuman. It is making a claim so contrary to the base moral 
assumptions that we share that it becomes almost impossible 
to engage with them. In these situations, what they’re saying 
is just so absurd that to argue with it no longer makes sense. 
They seem to not be a member of our linguistic and ethical 
community. When these statements are questioned, we may 
have exhausted our justifications and ‘reached bedrock with our 
spades turned.’ Perhaps the only answer here is to say “That 
claim is simply wrong.”
The Limitations of This View
 When I originally set out to write this article, I had much 
more lofty goals. I wanted to introduce universally normative 
statements within Wittgenstein’s epistemic framework. 
Unfortunately, such a goal has proven to be untenable. It 
seems impossible to push the inherently limited epistemic 
framework adopted by Wittgenstein to accept any standard 
of truth that would extend beyond the reach of one language-
using community. Such a conclusion is certainly painful for 
anyone aspiring to universal truth in ethics, especially given 
how persuasive Wittgenstein’s argumentation is. That said, if 
such a viewpoint is all that a careful and honest analysis of the 
epistemic situation allows, then we are obligated to adopt it.
 The largest reason that I am quite unhappy with this 
58
result is that it maintains the weirdness that is inherent in 
Wittgenstein’s epistemic system. How are we to adequately 
account for what happens when two completely separate 
language-using communities meet with each other? The 
communities have totally separate normative standards of 
truth, yet supposedly something will happen in their interaction, 
and one view will come out on top. It seems that here we are 
necessarily forced into one of two directions. The first possible 
route would be to accept that all truth standards are equally 
good, and that in such scenarios each community is equally 
right. This would be taking a relativist perspective. The second 
option would be to reject the very idea of truth in an absolute 
sense, claiming that from an outside perspective, to say that 
either community is really right would simply be a misuse of 
language. There is no criterion of correctness to be had from 
this outside perspective. This seems to be this position that 
Wittgenstein takes, rather than the relativist one. Such an 
account represents the destruction of the ‘capital T’ Truth. At 
the very least, it is a claim that argument about such a truth is 
altogether impossible (how one could adequately argue for the 
existence of such a truth from this framework is beyond me). 
Such a conclusion is deeply disappointing, especially in the 
context of ethics, where it seems to take some of the weight out 
of an area of life which you are expected to make significant 
sacrifices for.
Conclusion
 Limitations in mind, the framework expressed in 
this paper does accomplish a somewhat significant step in 
improving the tools of analysis that we have when discussing 
ethical disagreement from a Wittgensteinian epistemic 
perspective. Under Wittgenstein’s perspective, differences in 
worldview are just that: not analyzable in a systematic way and 
philosophically non-navigable. By offering an account of how 
practical identities are meaningfully similar in (giving context 
to moral obligation) to the way that forms of life give context 
to other linguistic expressions, I have enabled a somewhat 
comparable level of analysis of ethical statements to other 
linguistic contexts under a Wittgensteinian framework.
 The account offered here is certainly not a complete 
one. It still has a few rough edges. Specifically, I think that there 
is still room to improve the account of obligation from our 
identity as human that is offered in this paper. The claim that 
our identity as human is in some way basic makes sense even 
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within a Wittgensteinian framework. To call some person or 
action inhuman seems to be about the strongest ethical critique 
we have available. That said, the claims about our human 
identity being the base upon which all other identities build 
and the idea of what is essentially a human ‘species being’ as a 
social creature in need of identity are perhaps a bit out of place 
in a Wittgensteinian system. This is despite the fact that ethical 
bedrock claims do undoubtedly exist. Perhaps the structure 
they have been fit in within this paper is simply a bit too rigid.
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Analysing and Resisting American 
Citizens’ Insensitivity to Civilian 
Casualties of American Wars
Henry Barlow
The University of Sydney
American wars have had a considerable toll on the 
civilian populations of the countries they have been waged in. 
The best estimate of civilian deaths directly caused by coalition 
forces in The Iraq War is 11,516, which is three times higher 
than the deaths of coalition forces and accounts for 33% of 
Iraqi deaths in the war.48 The American public, however, is not 
particularly concerned by these casualties. American casualties 
play a far larger role in determining public support for wars, 
despite the fact that these are often much lower than civilian 
casualties (as seen in the figures above).49 
Such partiality is to be expected, but the indifference 
to civilian casualties should be meliorated for two reasons. 
Concern for civilian casualties is good from a moral-epistemic 
standpoint, insofar as these casualties are morally concerning. 
Many of these wars are partly justified by the aim of improving 
these civilians’ lives, hence their deaths at the hands of 
US forces are deeply unjust. I cannot explore this complex 
question further, so I will assume that more concern for civilian 
casualties than the indifference currently displayed is a moral-
epistemic improvement. These moral-epistemic improvements 
can in turn lead to political improvements. The public becoming 
more aware that civilian casualties are morally troubling might 
lead to greater public outcry about them, which might in turn 
lead to changes in foreign policy and military strategy that 
reduce civilian casualties.
48  Bruce Cronin, Bugsplat: The politics of Collateral Damage in 
Western Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 17.
49  John Tirman, The Deaths of Others: The Fate of Civilians in 
America’s Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 339; Cronin, 
Bugsplat, 17.
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In this essay, I will explore the nature of Americans’ 
insensitivity and propose strategies for meliorating it. I will 
argue that the epistemic structures it is rooted in and the fact 
that Americans are not aware that they are insensitive mean 
that certain strategies are particularly effective in combatting 
Americans’ insensitivity. In the first section, I will outline the 
social-epistemological terms that will be applied to Americans’ 
insensitivity - meta-blindness, meta-attitudes, and social 
imaginaries. Meta-blindness is José Medina’s term for the 
phenomenon whereby insensitive subjects are unaware that 
they are insensitive.50 In the second section, I will apply these 
concepts to international relations scholar John Tirman’s 
analysis of Americans’ insensitivity to civilian casualties. I will 
argue that two causes Tirman identifies, orientalism and the 
frontier myth, are dominant social imaginaries. Another cause, 
orientalist knowledge hierarchies, are meta-attitudes. I will 
argue that this implies that American citizens are blind to their 
insensitivity, something Tirman doesn’t identify. 
In the third section, I will outline the implications of 
this analysis for how insensitivity to civilian casualties must 
be combatted. I will argue that combatting this insensitivity 
requires something beyond pointing out that certain attitudes 
are insensitive or presenting sensitive attitudes. Specifically, 
it requires targeting meta-blindness and the background 
epistemic structures of orientalism and the frontier myth. I 
will argue that since these background epistemic structures are 
dominant social imaginaries and meta-attitudes, they should be 
challenged from different imaginaries and meta-attitudes that 
Americans can access. Meta-blindness should be combatted by 
engendering the comparison of different epistemic perspectives.
1. Meta-Blindness, Meta-Attitudes, and Social Imaginaries
This section will outline the paper’s governing social-
epistemological framework. I will first outline the sense in 
which emotions are epistemic attitudes. I will then explain what 
Medina means by the term meta-blindness, and set out what 
will be meant by the terms “insensitivity”, “concern”, and their 
antonyms throughout the paper. Finally, I will outline what 
meta-attitudes and social imaginaries are.
50  José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial 
Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 75.
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Because Americans have both beliefs and emotions 
about civilian casualties, it is important to clarify the epistemic 
significance of emotions. I cannot treat these issues in detail, 
but will briefly justify the claim that emotions are epistemic 
attitudes because they serve as reasons for belief. I will 
assume that the perception theory of emotions (which I will 
outline shortly) is correct. It is an example of a theory which 
sees emotions as involving what D’Arms and Jacobson call 
“evaluative presentations” of their objects, and theories of 
this kind are currently the majority view in the philosophy of 
emotion.51 Analogous arguments to those made in this paper 
could be made assuming any other evaluative presentation 
theory. 52
Christine Tappolet claims that emotions are perceptual 
experiences of an evaluative property, such as fearsomeness or 
admirability, in their object.53 If I fear a plant then I perceptually 
experience fearsomeness in it. Such perceptions can be fitting 
or unfitting depending on whether the object possesses the 
property in question.54 Fear of a lion is fitting, while fear of 
a sunflower is not. Perceptual experiences do not undertake 
epistemic commitments – I can perceptually experience a plant 
51  Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On 
the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 61, no. 1 (2000): 66. Scarantino and de Sousa, in a review article, 
claim “The dominant view on emotions is that they are representations 
of… formal objects” (Andrea Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa, “Emotion,” 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), edited 
by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/
emotion). See Daniel D. Hutto, “Truly Enactive Emotion,” Emotion Review 
4, no. 2 (2012): 179, for a contrary, non-representational view of emotions.
52  This is because all evaluative presentation theories can 
accommodate the idea that emotions are epistemic attitudes as easily as, or 
more easily than, the perception theory. Other evaluative presentation theories 
include the theory that emotions are judgments (see Robert C. Solomon, 
“Emotion and Choice,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 257-258) and the theory that 
emotions present their objects as falling under a “paradigm scenario” and 
thus make that object salient to the subject’s attention (Ronald de Sousa, The 
Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 201-202).
53  Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Values, and Agency (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 13, 15-16.
54  D’Arms and Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy,” 66-67; Tappolet, 
Emotions, 20.
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as fearsome and yet know that it is not fearsome. Emotions can 
nonetheless be seen as epistemic attitudes on the perception 
theory in the broad sense of attitudes that are relevant to 
epistemic commitments. Tappolet claims that emotions are 
reasons for beliefs in the same way visual experiences are: if we 
perceive fearsomeness in something, this is a prima facie reason 
to believe that it is fearsome.55 This means that emotions are 
relevant to knowledge and are thus epistemic attitudes in the 
broad sense. Moreover, fittingness is an epistemic norm – fitting 
emotions are reasons for correct beliefs, and unfitting emotions 
are reasons for incorrect beliefs. 
Fitting emotions about civilian casualties, on this view, 
lead Americans to correct beliefs and thus have the same moral-
epistemic and political benefits as correct beliefs. Outrage 
about a civilian casualty gives Americans a prima facie reason to 
believe that the casualty is outrageous. Outrage about civilian 
casualties should therefore be cultivated insofar as civilian 
casualties are outrageous, and insofar as believing a casualty 
to be outrageous can lead subjects to other correct beliefs, such 
as “the casualty was a terrible injustice”. Similarly, unfitting 
emotions like joy are prima facie reasons to form incorrect beliefs 
like the belief that a casualty is joyous, and so there are benefits 
to cultivating more fitting emotions. While the reason joy gives 
is firmly overruled by basic moral considerations of the value of 
human life, such considerations may not sway certain people, 
and replacing joy with a more fitting emotion might bring them 
to have correct beliefs. This indicates that emotions and beliefs 
have similar importance for my question, and I will speak of 
them concurrently as epistemic attitudes.56, 57
55  Tappolet, Emotions, 40.
56  This is not the only way to bring about correct beliefs about civilian 
casualties, for one can have unfitting emotions about a casualty and still 
acknowledge it as deeply wrong. Nonetheless, attempting to cultivate fitting 
emotions in Americans will give them reasons to change their beliefs, and 
might thereby cause some of them to do so.
57  Fitting emotions might also have distinctive political benefits 
due to their greater capacity to motivate action than beliefs. Because I am 
discussing emotions as epistemic attitudes, however, it is best to conceive of 
their benefits as coming from knowledge, rather than motivation. I will thus 
see fitting emotions’ political benefits as I do the benefits of correct beliefs 
- actions which follow from people knowing how morally troubling civilian 
casualties are. Nonetheless, investigating which strategies should be used to 
motivate political action, and whether these differ from those I propose in this 
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I will count absences of emotion as emotions. Thus, 
if a civilian casualty is outrageous and someone is apathetic 
in the face of it, their emotion is unfitting insofar as they are 
not perceiving the property of outrageousness. This is not a 
theoretical claim, for I do not think that absences of emotion 
are emotions, particularly assuming a perception theory on 
which emotions must perceive properties. It is rather a matter of 
convenience, insofar as not having a fitting emotion can inhibit 
people from acquiring correct beliefs about casualties in the 
same way that having an unfitting emotion “proper” like joy 
can. While the latter has more potential for distortion insofar as 
it gives an active reason to form an incorrect belief, some people 
might not consider casualties outrageous unless they have the 
prima facie reason outrage gives them. For such people, having 
no emotion can inhibit them from reaching correct beliefs 
insofar as it inhibits them from feeling outrage, and in this sense 
their absences of emotion are “unfitting emotions”.
Medina defines meta-blindness as a subject’s epistemic 
blindness with respect to their first-order epistemic attitudes.58 
First-order epistemic attitudes are about something that is not 
an epistemic attitude – for example, the belief that the earth is 
round. Second-order epistemic attitudes are about a subject’s 
own first-order epistemic attitudes – for example, A’s belief 
that A’s belief that the earth is round is correct. Meta-blindness 
always involves first-order epistemic attitudes about features of 
one’s social world, and second-order epistemic attitudes which 
are incorrect attitudes towards those first-order attitudes.59 
One could have first-order attitudes of incorrect beliefs about 
others (such as not knowing the difference between Shia and 
Sunni Islam), and a second-order attitude which is an incorrect 
belief about one’s first-order beliefs (such as thinking that one’s 
beliefs cover every part of the social world). The first-order 
attitude could also be affective, such as a lack of concern for 
the suffering of Muslims.60 Meta-blindness would here lie in an 
incorrect second-order belief about this lack of concern, such 
paper, would undoubtedly be of interest.
58  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 149.
59  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 75, 149.
60  Medina sees epistemic attitudes as “hybrid… cognitive-affective 
attitudes”, but does not defend this or elaborate on what it entails (José 
Medina, “Racial Violence, Emotional Friction, and Epistemic Activism,” 
Angelaki 24, no. 4 (2019): 25).
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as thinking that one is not wrong for lacking concern because 
the situation does not warrant concern. While the second-order 
attitudes could be affective (feeling concerned or unconcerned 
about one’s first-order attitudes), only cognitive second-order 
attitudes are required for my analysis.61
First-order blindness refers to first-order epistemic 
attitudes that are incorrect beliefs or unfitting emotions. I will, 
following Medina, refer to both of these as “insensitivities”, 
because it best captures the epistemic attitudes that are 
the focus of my paper.62 I will also refer to them as “first-
order insensitivities”, even though I do not use the term 
“second-order insensitivity”, in order to distinguish them 
from meta-blindness. Insensitivities could be cognitive, 
such as thinking a civilian casualty isn’t morally wrong, or 
affective, such as not feeling outrage at a needless casualty. 
Conversely, “sensitivities’ are correct beliefs or fitting emotions. 
Correctness and fittingness of beliefs and emotions come 
on a scale, so sometimes I will speak of attitudes as more or 
less sensitive than one another, rather than as “sensitivities” 
and “insensitivities”.  Beliefs and emotions about civilian 
casualties can be concerned – such as the belief that a casualty 
is unjust and outrage at a needless casualty –- or unconcerned. 
“Concern” and “unconcern” do not determine whether an 
attitude is correct or fitting – a concerned or unconcerned 
attitude could, depending on how the world is, be an 
insensitivity or a sensitivity. I have, however, assumed that the 
world is such that Americans coming to have more concern 
about civilian casualties is a moral-epistemic improvement.
Medina defines “meta-attitudes” as epistemic attitudes 
about one’s epistemic attitudes.63 Meta-attitudes could take 
many shapes, such as attitudes about one’s epistemic abilities.64 
For example, epistemic arrogance places undue credence in 
one’s beliefs, and an undue lack of credence in contradictory 
beliefs.65 Meta-attitudes influence epistemic life in several 
ways. For example, they determine which attitudes one takes 
seriously, and which are dismissed without consideration.66 
61  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 81.
62  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 89.
63  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 58. It is plausible to see meta-
blindness as itself a meta-attitude, but this is irrelevant to my argument.
64  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 58
65  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 31.
66  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 212.
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For example, epistemic arrogance leads people to dismiss 
anything which conflicts with their current attitudes.67 Meta-
attitudes also influence epistemic life by determining which 
epistemic attitudes a subject seeks out, and what subjects count 
as justification.68 Meta-attitudes can be beneficial as well as 
harmful – e- empiricism is a beneficial meta-attitude that places 
higher credence in attitudes for which there is evidence.
Moira Gatens defines the social imaginary as the 
“background” of “imaginings” by which individuals in a 
society can understand one another, with these imaginings 
including things like images and scripts.69 The social imaginary 
consists of many different imaginaries, some of which are 
dominant imaginaries such as the patriarchal imaginary and 
the white imaginary.70 When something falls outside dominant 
social imaginaries, it is “unimaginable” from within them.71 
Medina analyses how in To Kill a Mockingbird, “black pity 
for white subjects” and “a white girl coming on to” a black 
man are shown to be unimaginable within the dominant 
white imaginary of Jim Crow Alabama. Instead, the script of 
this imaginary read that black people “have a sexual agency 
out of control whereas white women lack sexual agency”.72 
Imaginaries can also influence affective life, for example by 
rendering one unable to experience sympathy for people who 
are dehumanised by the imaginary’s scripts.73
67  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 31-33.
68  Medina Epistemology of Resistance, 212.
69  Moira Gatens, “Imaginaries,” in 50 Concepts for a Critical 
Phenomenology, eds. Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019), 183; Charles Taylor, 
Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 
165, quoted in Gatens, “Imaginaries,” 183; Medina, Epistemology of 
Resistance, 67 n. 4.
70  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 78.
71  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 67-68.
72  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 67-68.
73  A relevant feature of social imaginaries is that they can be 
“internalized” by subjects, and can thus influence one’s beliefs and emotions 
even if one’s conscious beliefs refute the imaginary (Medina, Epistemology of 
Resistance, 269). Someone in Jim Crow Alabama who consciously believed 
that white people are not superior to black people could nonetheless be 
biased towards thinking that black people do not feel pity for white people. 
This is the well-known phenomenon of “implicit bias”. See Jennifer Saul, 
68
Subjects’ beliefs and emotions are not completely 
determined by dominant social imaginaries, for there are what 
Medina calls “alternative social imaginaries”.74 For example, 
the black imaginary within Jim Crow Alabama challenged the 
script of the white imaginary insofar as black people recognised 
the incorrectness of the white imaginary’s racist stereotypes.75 
People may come to inhabit different imaginaries, and thus be 
able to imagine what was previously unimaginable to them.76 
Nonetheless, since dominant imaginaries render many contents 
of other imaginaries unintelligible, entering other imaginaries is 
challenging for subjects under dominant imaginaries.77 Hereon, 
I will use “epistemic structures” to refer to both imaginaries and 
meta-attitudes.
2. The Insensitivity of American Citizens to Civilian 
Casualties
Having outlined the concepts of meta-blindness, meta-
attitudes, and the social imaginary, I am now in a position to 
analyse American citizens’ insensitivity to civilian casualties 
in terms of this framework. After going over part of the 
empirical evidence for Americans’ insensitivity, I will present 
Tirman’s case for orientalism and the frontier myth causing this 
insensitivity, noting that both are dominant social imaginaries. 
I will then present Tirman’s case for orientalist knowledge 
hierarchies causing insensitivity, noting that they are meta-
attitudes. Finally, I will argue that the influence of these 
epistemic structures would cause Americans to be meta-blind. 
The implications of this analysis for how insensitivity should be 
combatted will be presented in the next section.
Tirman presents empirical evidence for Americans’ 
insensitivity to civilian casualties, although notes that there 
is little survey data on this topic, which he claims is “itself a 
symptom” of indifference.78 I will present Tirman’s evidence 
for insensitivity to civilian casualties in the wars in Iraq, since 
“Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Epistemic Injustice,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile 
Pohlhaus (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 235-242.
74  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 78.
75  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 78.
76  Medina, “Racial Violence,” 31.
77  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 71.
78  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 338.
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these wars feature later in my paper. Analysing public polling, 
Tirman claims that “American casualties and achievement of 
war aims tend to be the key variables of popularity, not local 
impact”, which reflects indifference towards civilian casualties.79 
Tirman identifies that the public sphere also reflected 
indifference: “few major politicians… expressed compassion for 
the Iraqis’ suffering; no major religious figures came forward 
with calls to help the victims of violence…; editorials about Iraq 
in major newspapers rarely mentioned civilian casualties”.80 
Tirman doesn’t specify which epistemic attitudes are reflected 
in the public polling, but his description of the public sphere’s 
reaction indicates that Americans’ insensitivity involves both 
beliefs about the moral seriousness of civilian casualties and 
emotions directed towards those casualties. Tirman gives 
several causes of this insensitivity: government narratives, 
psychological defence mechanisms, orientalism, and the frontier 
myth.81 The latter two will be the focus of my analysis, because 
they most clearly demonstrate why Americans are meta-blind.
Tirman identifies both orientalism and the frontier myth 
as causes of American insensitivity, and while Tirman doesn’t 
use this term, both are dominant imaginaries. Margaret Kohn 
and Kavita Reddy define Edward Said’s concept of orientalism 
as referring to “a structured set of concepts, assumptions, and 
discursive practices” prevalent during colonial Europe “that 
were used to produce, interpret, and evaluate knowledge 
about non-European peoples”.82 These assumptions included 
associating negative traits with non-European people, with 
Said giving the example of seeing “the Arab” “as an oversexed 
degenerate,… sadistic, treacherous, low.”83 Said also identifies 
79  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 339. His analysis is that several 
polls from 2007 to 2009 showed a majority supported American withdrawal 
from Iraq, even though a majority believed such withdrawal would lead to 
Iraqi civilians being more vulnerable to attacks by insurgents. On the other 
hand, Operation Desert Storm’s public support went from 50% to 80% as the 
American military began to see success.
80  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 340.
81  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 342-359.
82  Margaret Kohn and Kavita Reddy, “Colonialism,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 edition), edited by Edward 
N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.
cgi?entry=colonialism; Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 344.
83  Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Vintage, 1979), 278-9, quoted in 
Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 345.
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that Arab people are not seen in their specificity as human 
beings under orientalism: “The Arab is always shown in 
large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics 
or experiences”.84 Tirman identifies that these orientalist 
assumptions have underlain American attitudes towards the 
civilian populations of American wars, and have reinforced 
insensitivity.85 These populations have often been Asian and 
Arab populations who are subject to orientalist stereotypes. 
Furthermore, Tirman notes that American empire has been 
“based in part on a supposition of white superiority”, and that 
the American military has notably used such racial slurs as 
“gooks” and “hajis”.86 Orientalism is a social imaginary which 
Americans inhabit, since it is based on representations of Asian 
and Arab populations. Moreover, it is a dominant imaginary, 
insofar as non-orientalist imaginaries are less accessible to 
Americans than orientalist imaginaries.
This imaginary engenders insensitivity. In their research 
on Israeli citizens’ reactions to Palestinian civilians dying at the 
hands of Israeli forces, social psychologist Noa Schori-Eyal and 
collaborators found that viewing civilians harmed in war in 
dehumanising ways leads to perceiving them as less common 
with oneself.87 This, in turn, makes one more likely to tolerate 
harms to those civilians.88 Americans influenced by orientalism 
see civilians in derogatory and dehumanising ways, and are 
therefore less likely to form concerned attitudes about civilian 
casualties.
Tirman defines the frontier myth as a “set of ideas, 
myths, and self-identities” in which America is seen as having 
a “mission” of “taming… the wilderness” and the “savages” 
who live there.89 The earliest example of this in the public 
conscience is the violence European-American colonisers 
committed against Indigenous peoples, and Tirman claims 
84  Said, Orientalism, 278-9, quoted in Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 
345;
85  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 344
86  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 236, 344.
87  Noa Schori-Eyal, Eran Halperin, and Tamar Saguy, “Intergroup 
Commonality, Political Ideology, and Tolerance of Enemy Collateral 
Casualties in Intergroup Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 3 
(2019): 434.
88  Schori-Eyal, Halperin, and Saguy, “Intergroup Commonality,” 434.
89  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 350-351
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that the myth has underlain American global expansion.90 He 
identifies a particular conception of violence as central to this 
myth. Firstly, the violence is seen as “defensive” or “reactive”, 
responding to provocation from external forces (for example, to 
provocation from “Indian savagery”).91 Secondly, the violence 
is seen as “regenerative”, as reaffirming the “moral worth of 
its practitioner.” In the modern context, this takes the form 
of reaffirming “the natural rightness of Anglo-Saxon liberty”, 
among other things.92 
This is a dominant imaginary, and Tirman claims 
that it underlies American responses to civilian casualties 
and engenders insensitivity. While Tirman doesn’t label it as 
an imaginary, he notes it is deeply rooted in the American 
psyche and “powerfully shapes the attitudes and behaviour of 
Americans from childhood.”93 This imaginary structures how 
Americans see wars and the civilians in them, since American 
wars are often framed under the lenses of defensive and 
regenerative violence (for example, The Iraq War was seen as 
regeneration after “a period of softness” which had resulted, in 
this imaginary, in 9/11).94 This way of seeing wars engenders 
insensitivity. Tirman identifies that it creates a script on which 
civilians are not the focus, being rather “players in this drama” 
which is truly about America’s moral redemption.95 Americans’ 
reactions to civilian casualties are determined by this script, 
which stifles concern insofar as it accords no harm to civilians, 
or frames harms that do occur as justified insofar as they are 
defensive and regenerative.96
Tirman claims that another side of orientalism fosters 
insensitivity, namely hierarchies of knowledge which mediate 
90  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 350.
91  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 351. Tirman cites empirical 
evidence which shows that support for reactive violence among Americans 
is “positively correlated with the embrace of “frontier values”” (Tirman, 
The Deaths of Others, 352; James Shields and Leonard Weinberg, “Reactive 
Violence and the American Frontier: A Contemporary Evaluation,” Western 
92  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 351-352.
93  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 360.
94  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 353.
95  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 353.
96  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 354
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the way in which people in “The Orient” are understood.97 
These knowledge hierarchies are meta-attitudes. American 
orientalist knowledge hierarchies unduly privilege the 
American social sciences, such as historiography and 
international relations. These disciplines are thought to lead 
to “knowledge” of other cultures, while voices from those 
cultures “are not heard”, and “are discounted as… ignorant” 
on the rare occasions when they are heard (Tirman cites the 
US public’s reaction to the polls of Iraqi civilians).98 Such 
knowledge hierarchies constitute a meta-attitude about 
what counts as “knowledge” of these civilians, namely that 
“knowledge” of them does not come from their mouths, hearts, 
and bodies, but from American expertise. Tirman claims that 
these knowledge hierarchies engender American insensitivity 
because they makes it such that the American public “knows”, 
with “scientific veracity”, that foreign populations have traits 
which justify violence (for example, having “no appreciation 
for freedom”).99 This makes Americans see their unconcerned 
attitudes towards civilian casualties, that are in fact insensitive, 
as justified.
The preceding analyses indicate that American citizens 
are meta-blind because these citizens have epistemic structures 
which block epistemic counterpoints, and can avail themselves 
of several justifications for their cognitively and affectively 
insensitive attitudes.100 Medina calls epistemic attitudes 
that conflict with one’s own “epistemic counterpoints”.101 
The imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier myth 
inhibit Americans from experiencing such counterpoints by 
rendering concerned attitudes towards civilian casualties 
unimaginable. This unimaginability inhibits Americans from 
coming to concerned attitudes themselves, which might act as 
counterpoints to their other epistemic attitudes. For example, 
perhaps without the imaginary of orientalism an American 
might feel sympathy for the family of a civilian casualty, which 
97  While this could be analysed as part of the social imaginary of 
orientalism, I prefer to analyse the imaginary as involving imaginings, and I 
do not see knowledge ascription as an imagining.
98  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 345-346.
99  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 346-347
100  Medina gives arguments for why imaginaries and meta-attitudes 
generally cause meta-blindness, which I have drawn on for my specific 
claims here (Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 82, 149, 306).
101  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 70, 75.
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would challenge their belief that “that killing was, on balance, 
justified.” The unimaginability of sensitive attitudes can also 
distort Americans’ interpretations of epistemic counterpoints 
that others articulate. Imagine someone expresses the belief that 
a civilian casualty was unjust. Such concern is incompatible 
with the orientalist imaginary, so it might be distorted for 
someone living under that imaginary – they might see it as a 
mere expression of the speaker’s sadness about their day, rather 
than a claim about the world. Thus, the imaginaries preclude 
Americans from experiencing concerned attitudes (whether 
held by themselves or others) which would challenge their 
insensitivity. This makes them unable to acknowledge that their 
beliefs and emotions are insensitive, rendering them meta-
blind.
Even if Americans did experience epistemic 
counterpoints, however, their imaginaries and meta-attitudes 
would diminish the counterpoints’ ability to make them 
aware of their limitations. This is because these structures 
distort Americans’ judgments of which attitudes are sensitive 
and which insensitive. I have argued that knowledge 
hierarchies engender first-order insensitivity by justifying 
unconcerned attitudes, but this justification also entrenches 
meta-blindness by making Americans see their insensitive 
attitudes as sensitive.102 According to these meta-attitudes, 
unconcerned attitudes are correct or fitting since they accord 
with American “expertise” and are not blinded by “inferior” 
forms of knowledge. The imaginaries similarly justify 
unconcerned attitudes. The frontier myth renders unconcerned 
beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties sensitive, since 
they correctly respond to the properties of American moral 
regeneration, and are not blinded by considerations irrelevant 
to the expansion of the frontier. Deep concern is an insensitive 
attitude towards civilian casualties according to the orientalist 
imaginary, on which civilians are unworthy of respect and 
lack the individuality which might give special value to their 
lives. According to this imaginary, callous attitudes, rather 
than concerned ones, correctly perceive the properties of 
civilian casualties. Thus, these imaginaries and meta-attitudes 
make Americans see their unconcerned attitudes, which are 
insensitive, as sensitive. These are incorrect attitudes towards 
102  I am using “sensitive” in a technical sense here to mean correct 
belief or fitting emotion, and Americans would likely not describe their 
attitudes with this word. My point is that they see attitudes which are in fact 
incorrect beliefs or unfitting emotions as correct or fitting.
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their beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties, and thus 
constitute meta-blindness.
3. Combatting Insensitivity
I have claimed that American citizens are meta-blind 
with respect to their insensitivity to civilian casualties, and that 
this meta-blindness is rooted in the dominant imaginaries of 
orientalism and the frontier myth, as well as the meta-attitudes 
of orientalist knowledge hierarchies. I will now show how 
this analysis suggests ways in which insensitivity should be 
combatted. I will first outline two seemingly intuitive strategies 
for combatting insensitivity, which do not target meta-blindness 
or background epistemic structures: highlighting insensitivity 
and presenting sensitive attitudes. I will then argue that 
such strategies are inadequate, and background epistemic 
structures and meta-blindness must be directly targeted. I will 
suggest strategies that directly target each of these. Epistemic 
structures can be challenged by utilising different imaginaries 
and meta-attitudes, while meta-blindness can be challenged by 
engendering comparison of different epistemic perspectives. 
I will give concrete examples of these strategies from the 
MoMA’s exhibition “Theater of Operations: The Gulf Wars 
1991-2011”.103
An intuitive way of combatting American insensitivity 
focuses on first-order insensitive attitudes without regard to 
their background epistemic structures or Americans’ meta-
blindness. Two strategies which do this are highlighting 
insensitivity and presenting sensitive attitudes. Imagine that 
someone expresses a callous attitude towards a civilian casualty 
like “their life wasn’t worth much”. Highlighting insensitivity 
involves telling the speaker that what they said was insensitive, 
for example by saying “that’s quite callous of you”. Presenting 
a sensitive attitude involves exhibiting a concerned attitude 
towards the casualties, for example saying “that attack was 
horrific”.
103  I have not seen this exhibition in person, and my knowledge of it 
is from the following sources: “Theater of Operations: The Gulf Wars 1991-
2011,” MoMA, accessed June 10, 2020, https://www.moma.org/calendar/
exhibitions/5084; Tim Arango and Jason Farago, “These Artists Refuse 
to Forget the Wars in Iraq,” New York Times, November 14, 2019; Neil 
MacFarquhar, “Mourning Iraq’s Destruction, a Native Son Creates,” New 
York Times, December 31, 2019; Eleni Zaras, “New York City’s MoMA PS1 
“Gulf Wars” Exhibition Caught in Crossfire,” The Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs 39, no. 3 (2020): 48-50.
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These methods, while effective to some extent, are 
insufficient as a complete strategy for combatting American 
insensitivity, since forms of insensitivity may remain in 
the face of such challenges unless epistemic structures and 
meta-blindness are directly targeted. If Americans’ epistemic 
structures are not targeted, the challenges identified above 
will often be unimaginable or unjustified to them. As 
previously identified, Americans often interpret sensitive 
attitudes incorrectly due to the imaginaries’ distortions. 
Even if sensitive attitudes can be correctly interpreted, they 
might be written off as insensitive since meta-attitudes and 
imaginaries distort judgments of sensitivity and insensitivity. 
Similarly, highlighting insensitivity might be ineffective, as 
the insensitive subject might think that their attitude is not 
insensitive – they’re not callous, they’re having a clear-thinking 
reaction to a justified killing. Because of these ways in which 
insensitivities can remain in the face of first-order challenges to 
insensitivity, orientalism and the frontier myth must be directly 
targeted. Because I analysed them as imaginaries and meta-
attitudes, I can avail myself of Medina’s strategy for combatting 
such epistemic structures. This is the strategy of challenging 
epistemic structures from different epistemic structures that 
Americans may access.
Recall that subjects in dominant imaginaries are 
not wholly stuck there, but can enter different imaginaries. 
Alternative social imaginaries can challenge the dominant 
one.104 For example, perhaps certain American citizens can 
enter a pacifist imaginary and see the world through its 
lens. This might lead them to outrage at civilian casualties. 
Nonetheless, alternative imaginaries might be inaccessible to 
one who is stuck within a dominant imaginary that renders 
the contents of alternative imaginaries unimaginable or 
unjustified. The frontier myth renders it unimaginable that 
peace could be sustained, because that would end the frontier 
myth.105 Therefore, subjects who inhabit the frontier myth 
might be unable to inhabit a pacifist imaginary. This means that 
resistance from within a different dominant imaginary could be 
necessary.106 For example, Dia al-Azzawi’s painting “Mission of 
Destruction” directly challenges the frontier myth by drawing 
104  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 257
105  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 366.
106  Medina “Racial violence”, 32-33.
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on Picasso’s “Guernica” (American troops are on the right, 
Iraqis on the left):107
Dia al-Azzawi, “Mission of Destruction”
“Guernica” is not a dominant imaginary in American 
society as a whole, but it is in the context of a modern art 
gallery. This painting uses this imaginary to frame American 
troops not as saviours or as engaging in regenerative violence, 
but as engaging in violence equivalent to the horrifying 
violence of “Guernica”. This uses a different dominant 
imaginary which people in the art gallery inhabit (“Guernica”) 
to challenge the frontier myth. 
Similar strategies can be used to challenge meta-
attitudes. Challenges can come from meta-attitudes the subject 
doesn’t currently possess, but can come to possess, such as 
meta-attitudes which privilege local knowledge over American 
“expertise”. Alternatively, challenges can come from a different 
meta-attitude the subject currently possesses, for example using 
the meta-attitude of empiricism to challenge the meta-attitude 
of privileging American expertise, as this expertise gets things 
empirically wrong (for example, being wrong about what 
will be politically stabilising). Thus, combatting Americans’ 
107  MacFarquhar, “Mourning Iraq’s Destruction.”
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insensitivity requires directly targeting background epistemic 
structures, and my analysis of their insensitivity suggests 
doing this by challenging Americans’ epistemic structures from 
different epistemic structures they can access.
Combatting insensitivity to civilian casualties also 
requires targeting meta-blindness directly. Combatting 
meta-blindness involves creating an awareness of first-order 
insensitivities.108 For Americans, this would be an awareness 
of their inability to have certain beliefs about and affective 
attitudes towards civilian casualties. In order to ensure that 
Americans overcome insensitivities in new contexts that 
generate new insensitivities, Americans must be vigilant about 
checking their epistemic limitations and seeking out alternative 
perspectives that might correct those limitations. These 
habits can be fostered by combatting meta-blindness to make 
them aware that they have limitations. It might be that some 
level of awareness of limitations is achieved by highlighting 
insensitivities and presenting sensitivities, since one might 
become humbler upon being corrected. This is by no means 
guaranteed, however. We should therefore consider strategies 
which try to directly combat meta-blindness.
The strategy Medina proposes for combatting meta-
blindness is encouraging people to compare different epistemic 
perspectives with their own.109 Through a comparison of 
sensitive and insensitive perspectives on civilian casualties, 
insensitive subjects can become more aware of their epistemic 
limitations. If an American compares their perspective on 
civilian casualties with an Iraqi’s, the more concerned attitudes 
in the latter than in the former are highlighted. The American 
might thereby realise that such concern is sensitive, and their 
absence of concern is insensitive.110 “Theater of Operations” 
encourages its audience to engage in such comparison. It 
contains works by both Western and non-Western artists, 
including artists from Iraq and Kuwait, allowing comparison 
not merely between cognitive perspectives, but affective ones as 
well, insofar as these perspectives are expressed in emotionally 
108  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 186-190.
109  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 199-201.
110  I acknowledge that this strategy is limited insofar as many of 
the perspectives presented for comparison with the American one will 
be distorted or rendered insensitive by Americans’ background epistemic 
structures. The two strategies I have proposed in this section should therefore 
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charged artworks.111 For example, many works focus on media 
representations of the Gulf War. Michel Auder’s “Gulf War TV 
War” plays footage from contemporary news broadcasts.112
Michel Auder, “Gulf War TV War”
These images depict the war as, in Tim Arango’s words, 
“a sanitized… war without a lot of casualties”.113 They convey 
the dominant epistemic perspective, and it is insensitive to 
civilian casualties. The work also conveys Auder’s perspective, 
which criticises the dominant perspective without showing 
what that perspective misses. Yet the exhibition also contains 
works from Iraqi artists which present sensitive attitudes that 
the dominant perspective misses. Hanaa Malallah’s “She/He 
Has No Picture” is a series of portraits of the victims of a US 
bomb strike that killed 400 people in the Amiriyah shelter.114
111  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget,” and Zaras, 
“Exhibition Caught in Crossfire,” 48-50 mention this comparison of 
perspectives.
112  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
113  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
114  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
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Hanaa Malallah, “She/He Has No Picture”
The texture of these paintings is disrupted, making 
it seem like they are disintegrating. This disintegration is 
juxtaposed with the often lively, smiling faces, conveying a 
great sense of loss.115 Mallalah’s works mourns these casualties, 
and this is a sensitive attitude towards them. Considered alone, 
Auder’s work and Malallah’s highlight an insensitivity and 
present a sensitivity, respectively. The exhibition as a whole, 
however, allows for direct comparison of Malallah’s sensitive 
perspective with the perspective of the American media, 
promoting awareness of the absence of concern in the latter 
perspective. Viewers can also compare it with Auder’s critical 
perspective, seeing that Auder does not perceive what is missed 
by the dominant perspective and acknowledging this as a blind 
spot in Auder’s perspective.
4. Conclusion
American citizens are meta-blind with respect to 
their insensitivity to civilian casualties: they do not know 
that they are insensitive. Their insensitivity is rooted in the 
dominant social imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier 
myth, as well as in the meta-attitude of orientalist knowledge 
hierarchies. This means Americans are likely meta-blind, since 
these epistemic structures prevent them from engaging with 
epistemic counterpoints that would make them aware that they 
115  This analysis is inspired by John Farago’s in Arango and Farago, 
“These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
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are insensitive, and distort their judgments of which attitudes 
are sensitive and which insensitive.
Identifying the role of imaginaries, meta-attitudes, and 
meta-blindness in American insensitivity has implications for 
how insensitivity should be combatted. Effectively combatting 
insensitivity requires directly targeting Americans’ meta-
blindness and their background epistemic structures. I thus 
suggest two strategies for combatting insensitivity –- comparing 
differing epistemic perspectives to combat meta-blindness, 
and using different epistemic structures Americans can access 
to challenge the epistemic structures of orientalism and the 
frontier myth.
I have provided a novel analysis of Americans’ 
insensitivity to civilian casualties, and suggested novel ways 
for combatting this insensitivity. The effectiveness of various 
strategies is not settled by the arguments I have presented, and 
interdisciplinary empirical work needs to be done to determine 
which strategies are the most effective. Finding the best strategy 
possible is necessary for producing the moral-epistemic 
and political benefits of combatting insensitivity to civilian 
casualties.
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